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ABSTRACT 
Canada is an aging society. The number of people aged 
sixty-five and over is rising, while the number of people under 
twenty is declining. These two concurrent changes in the age 
structure have produced a sh~ft in the demographic composition 
of Canada which is commonly referred to as the aging phenomenon. 
Regardless of whether or not the number of people under 
twenty continues to decline, the number of elderly in Canada 
will almost double over the next twenty years. This rapidly 
growing elderly clientele will doubtless have an impact on 
Canadian governments. Federal, provincial and municipal 
governments are presently providing a variety of programs that 
have a special bearing on the aged and most senior citizens are 
beneficiaries of one or more of these programs. The 
ramifications of a rapidly growing elderly clientele are 
obvious. 
In order to cope with the impact of a significant 
increase in the number of elderly persons, the development and 
implementation of aging policy must be co-ordinated at each 
level of government and between and among levels of government. 
If aging policy is not co-ordinated, the results are likely to 
be: inappropriate policy decisions; duplication and overlap; 
and, ineffective and irresponsive services. No one benefits 
from these results. The need for co-ordination is apparent. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine existing 
governmental efforts to co-ordinate policy in the field of 
aging. These efforts are examined by focusing on interactions 
directed at co-ordination between and among major actors in 
aging policy. A framework is used to structure the description 
and analysis of these interactions. The variables of 
formalisation and intensity and the concept of power are 
instrumental in analysing interactions for co-ordination. The 
underlying intent of this thesis is to discover some of the 
main gaps in existing governmental efforts to co~ordinate aging 
policy. 
Gaps are, in fact, discovered. Several explanations 
for the existence of gaps in interactions for co-ordination are 
discussed. A major hypothesis involving a relationship between 
a bureaucratic form of organisation and interactions for co-
ordination is suggested. Finally, three recommendations for 
improving co-ordination in aging policy are offered. 
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Coordination will not necessarily occur unless 
a conscious effort is made to cause it to occur. 
Responsibility has to be assigned to ensure the 
process is initiated and to overcome the inertia 
inherent in the patterns of humans and the 
organisations they form. 
Graham Clarkson 
"The Need for Coordination 
in Planning and in Programs 
and Services", National 
Symposium on Aging, 1978. 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
The Aging Phenomenon 
Canada has "come of age." An aging society has been 
defined as one whose proportion of the population aged 65 and 
over exceeds the 8 per cent mark. 1 Canada passed that mark in 
1971. By the year 2001, the elderly (i.e., people aged 65 and 
over) 2 will account for 12 per cent of the total population. 3 
This percentage will continue to climb until it peaks in 2031 
around the 20 per cent mark. These projections for increases 
in the proportion of aged persons in Canada are based on current 
birth rates and migration patterns. 
The increase in the proportion of the elderly is the 
result of two concurrent changes in the age structure. The 
number of people aged sixty-five and over is rising, while the 
number of people under twenty is declining. These two changes 
have produced a shift in the demographic composition of Canada 
which is commonly referred to as the aging phenomenon. 
1 
2 
A Rapidly Growing Elderly Clientele 
Regardless of whether or not the overall proportion 
of persons aged sixty-five and over will increase according to 
the projections noted above, the next two decades will witness 
a near doubling of the number of elderly in Canada. This 
increase in the number of people aged sixty:-five and over is not 
premised on assumptions (i.e., the current birth rates and 
migration patterns remain constant), but on present demographic 
4 
evidence. In the mid 1970's, the elderly comprised 
approximately 1.7 million of the total Canadian population. 
They will, barring some future catastrophe, account for about 
3.3 million of the total population by the year 2001. This 
increase does not even include the baby boom children whose 
first members will turn sixty-five shortly after the turn of 
the century. 
For the governments of Canada, an increase in the number 
of elderly of this magnitude means that they are faced with a 
rapidly growing elderly clientele. Federal, provincial and 
municipal governments are presently involved in the provision 
of programs for the aged (i.e., programs which have a special 
bearing on the elderly). Most senior citizens are recipients 
of one or more of these programs. At the very least, a rapidly 
growing elderly clientele will result in increased government 
expenditures. Governments will have to spend more money on 
existing programs for the aged simply because more of them will 
be using these programs, and this is only one of many likely 
repercussions of a rapidly growing elderly c1iente1e. 5 
The Need for Co-ordination 
In order to cope with the ramifications of a rapidly 
growing elderly clientele, the development and implementation 
3 
of aging policy must be co-ordinated. The development of policy 
involves both the selection of objectives and the means to 
a~hieve those objectives. Policy implementation refers to the 
actual delivery of the means (e.g., programs) selected to achieve 
policy objectives. Aging policy entails a number of diverse 
programs (e.g., income assistance, living accommodations, 
health services and transportation subsidies) and it is generally 
viewed as falling under the umbrella of social policy.6 The word 
co-ordination implies a bringing together of parts into proper 
relation. 7 Therefore, the co-ordination of the development and 
implementation of aging policy involves: (1) relating aging 
policy objectives to each other; (2) relating these objectives 
to the means of achieving them; (3) relating objectives and 
means to the practicalities of implementation; and, (4) relating 
the actual delivery of the means selected to achieve policy 
objectives. Furthermore, these various parts must be related 
in such a way that: (1) appropriate policy decisions are 
selected; (2) duplication and overlap are avoided; and, (3) 
effective and responsive services are provided. 8 The word 
proper in the previously cited definition of co-ordination 
pertains to the kind of relation that must be made in order to 
fulfill these three criteria. 
Co-ordinating the development and implementation of 
aging policy is not an easy task. In the first place, aging 
policy is not homogeneous. As noted above, it is a mixed bag 
composed of related but not similar programs. Secondly, this 
very characteristic of aging policy means that a variety of 
governmental and nongovernmental actors are directly or 
indirectly involved in its development and implementation. 
Governmental actors include departments or agencies at all 
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three levels of government. Aging policy does not fit neatly 
into anyone constitutional area of jurisdiction nor does it 
fall within anyone vertical portfolio. 9 Nongovernmental actors 
consist of organisations at each level of government which 
represent or provide services to the elderly (e.g., advisory 
councils on aging, associations on gerontology and senior 
citizens' groups). Both the multifaceted nature of aging policy 
and the variety of actors involved in this policy field make 
co-ordination difficult yet necessary. For example, not only 
must the development and implementation of aging policy be 
co-ordinated at each level of government but the same exercise 
10 
must occur between and among levels of government. 
Co-ordination in Government 
The subject of co-ordination in government has generated 
much discussion among academics and practitioners. It has 
become increasingly important as governments have grown in size 
and complexity. More research is needed, however, to discover 
how governments perform or achieve co-ordination. Implicit in 
this statement is the recognition that co-ordination is both a 
separate managerial activity (i.e., one of several managerial 
functions in Luther Gulick's formulation of POSDCORB--planning 
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organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and 
budgeting), and a result of other managerial activities (i.e., 
co-ordination is achieved by good planning, good organising and 
so on). 
Since co-ordination can be both a separate managerial 
activity and the result of other managerial activities, how can 
co-ordination in government be examined? The key to answering 
this question lies in examining interactions between and among 
actors within a policy field. ll All managerial activities 
require some kind of interaction. Consequently, regardless of 
whether or not co-ordination is a separate managerial activity 
or the result of other managerial activities, interaction is 
required. It is, therefore, possible to examine co-ordination 
in government through the identification and analysis of 
interactions between and among actors in a policy field. 
For analytical purposes, it is not necessary to 
scrutinise all interactions. While co-ordination requires 
interaction, not all interaction is linked to co-ordination. 
Interactions can take place for any number of reasons. Only 
those interactions that involve a conscious effort to co-ordinate 
or a deliberate attempt to achieve co-ordination can be evaluated 
f d ff 1 t ' h' 12 or cause an e ect re a lons lpS. Such interactions go 
beyond a mere exchange of information or some process of 
negotiation. 13 They involve a deliberate intent to bring parts 
into proper relation. Consequently, co-ordination in government 
can be examined by focusing on interactions specifically aimed 
or directed at co-ordination. 
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The Purpose and Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify, describe 
and analyse interactions conducted explicitly for the purpose of 
co-ordinating the development and implementation of aging 
policy at each level of government and between and among 
orders of government. In the process of fulfilling this 
objective, an overall assessment of present governmental 
efforts to co-ordinate policy in the field of aging can emerge. 
This thesis, in large part, is designed to discover some of the 
major gaps in these efforts and its findings can lead to specific 
recommendations for improvement. The discovery of gaps and 
recommendations for improvement are especially important at 
this point in time since any existing deficiencies in efforts 
to co-ordinate aging policy are likely to be exacerbated as the 
number of elderly increases. 
The methodology used in this thesis incorporates 
description and analysis. At least in this thesis, the two 
cannot be easily separated. 14 A characteristic feature of any 
new research is that a detailed account of its subject matter 
requires constant critical examination. For example, analysis 
is an integral part of the process of gathering and selecting 
relevant information for the purpose of description. Analysis 
is also required for the accurate depiction of a subject matter. 
Given the difficulty of separating description and 
analysis, it is possible to distinguish generally between the 
two with respect to the contents of this thesis. The 
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descriptive part of the thesis essentially centres on describing 
interations specifically directed at co-ordinating the development 
and implementation of aging policy at each level of government 
and between and among orders of government. The analytical 
part of the thesis involves an analysis of these interactions 
according to the variables of formalisation and intensity and 
the concept of power. 
Interactions aimed at co-ordination can be analysed 
d ' h 'bl f f I' , d 't 't 15 accor lng to t e varla es 0 orma lsatlon an ln enSl y. 
Each of these variables has two measures. The two measures of 
formalisation are: (1) the extent to which interaction for 
co-ordination has received official approval; and, (2) the 
extent to which a co-ordinating mechanism exists between the 
t ' 1 d 16 ac ors lnvo ve • Co-ordinating mechanisms are structures 
that exist to facilitate interactions for the purpose of 
co-ordination. The two measures of intensity are: (1) the 
extent of the resources required by the interaction for 
co-ordination (i.e., the size of the resource investment in 
terms of time, personnel, and money); and, (2) the frequency of 
the interaction aimed at co-ordination (i.e., the regularity of 
. t . t' ) 17 ln erac lon . It should be noted that in this thesis the 
variables of formalisation and intensity only pertain to 
interactions explicitly aimed at co-ordination. In addition, 
groups of interactions as opposed to individual interactions 
are analysed with respect to formalisation and intensity. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine each individual 
interaction. 
The concept of power is also useful for analysing 
interactions. Interactions constitute relations between and 
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among actors. Is is generally agreed that power is a relational 
concept. Power can be defined as "the capacity to secure the 
dominance of one's values or goals. 1I18 Kernaghan views power 
as taking two forms; namely control and influence. He defines 
control as "that form of power in which A has the authority 
[in the legal-rational sense] to direct or command B to do 
something.,,19 In this case, A exercises control over B. 
Influence is described as "a more general and pervasive form 
of power than control. B conforms to A's desires on the 
grounds of suggestion, persuasion, emulation, or anticipation 
In this case, A exercises influence over B. The 
possession of legal-rational authority does not exclude the 
use of influence, but the absence of the former does preclude 
the use of control. In addition, the exercise of control or 
influence is not necessarily unidirectional. B can respond to 
A's use of control or influence with the reciprocal exercise of 
influence. Interactions for the purpose of co-ordination can, 
therefore, involve the use of control and/or influence. Hence, 
the concept of power is an important tool for analysing these 
interactions. 
An Overview of the Thesis 
In all, this thesis required several steps. The first 
step entailed an accumulation of data from the following 
sources: 
1. Published literature on the aging phenomenon and 
demographic trends in Canada 
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2. Published literature, both theoretical and practical 
in nature, on co-ordinat'ion 
3. Published government literature (e.g., pamphlets, 
annual reports, studies) 
4. Unpublished internal government literature (e.g., 
confidential reports, working papers, memoranda) 
5. Correspondence and interviews with key governmental 
actors in the field of aging at each level of government 
6. Correspondence with key nongovernmental actors 
from organisations which represent or provide services to the 
elderly 
Written correspondence and personal interviews with governmental 
and nongovernmental actors took place from May 1980 to January 
1981. Each actor was asked a series of questions designed to 
elicit information on: 
1. Governmental and nongovernmental actors directly 
or indirectly involved in aging policy at each level of 
government 
2. Interactions deliberately directed at co-ordination 
in the field of aging 
3. An assessment of these interactions according to 
the variables of formalisation and intensity 
The next two steps of this thesis included the use of a framework 
to organise the data collected from step one and to structure the 
description and evaluation of interactions. The final step 
involved the formulation of general conclusions, recommendations 
for improvement and suggested hypotheses for further investigation. 
In addition to this introductory chapter, there are six 
other chapters in this thesis. Chapter II outlines the framework 
that was used to structure the description and evaluation of 
interactions for the purpose of co-ordination in aging policy. 
Chapters III, IV, and V focus on interactions at each level of 
government, while Chapter VI deals with interactions between 
and among orders of government. The final chapter contains 
general conclusions, recommendations for improvement and 
hypotheses regarding co-ordination in the field of aging. 
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CHAPTER II 
A Useful Framework 
Kernaghan's Institutional Framework 
The framework used in this thesis to structure the 
description and analysis of interactions is a modified version 
of an institutional framework developed by Kenneth Kernaghan for 
the purpose of analysing public organisations. 
Kernaghan's institutional framework is designed to 
identify and examine a number of interactions between and among 
. t .. t . th 1 . 21 varlOUS actors or par lClpan s ln e po lCY process. More 
specifically, it focuses on interactions: (1) within public 
organisations; (2) between and among public organisations; and, 
(3) between and among public organisations and other actors in 
the policy process. Interactions can flow in two directions 
(i.e., from one actor to another and back) and they can be 
conducted by specific individuals (e.g., cabinet minister, 
deputy minister) or a collectivity (e.g., government department, 
pressure/interest group). The term pubZic organisation, as it 
is used in the framework, refers to a government department or 
agency. Other potentiaZ actors in the policy process include: 
government institutions at one level of government (i.e., the 
executive, the legislature and the courts); public organisations 
and government institutions at other levels of government 
11 
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as well as intergovernmental bodies (e.g., intergovernmental 
committees and conferences); and, nongovernmental organisations 
(e.g., interest/pressure groups, news media). 
The concept of power underlies Kernaghan's institutional 
framework. Power, depicted as a relational concept, is 
interpreted as the sum of control and influence. The interactions 
identified by the framework can be examined according to whether 
they involve the exercise of control or influence or both of 
22 these forms of power. The exercise of control or influence, 
like the interactions themselves, is not necessarily unidirectional. 
For example, one actor can exercise control in an interaction 
while the recipient of that interaction exercises influence in 
return. Both control and influence can be used in interactions 
within and between organisations; however, intraorganisational 
interactions generally involve the exercise of control and 
interorganisational interactions tend to involve the exercise 
of influence. 
The institutional framework developed by Kernaghan is 
depicted in Table 1. Its major components are: broad patterns 
of interaction; categories of interaction; actors involved in 
each category of interaction; and, the power resources available 
to the actors. All of the potential interactions suggested by 
the framework are viewed from the perspective of a particular 
government department at a specific level of government. It is 
the department which remains the constant actor throughout and 
any interactions devoid of departmental participation are not 
considered. 
TABLE 1 13 
Kernaghan I S Institutional Framework 
1 2 3 4 
Broad Patterns Major Categories 
of Interaction of Interaction Actors Power Resources 
Line Units 
Internal Intradepart- Staff Units 
rrental Field Units 
Interdepart- Focal Department 
!rental other Departments 
Focal Department Expertise 
Experience 
Discretionary Power 
Clientele Support 
Prime Minister/ Appointrnent/Removal 
Premier Powers 
Executive- Infonnation and 
bureaucratic Advice frau 
External Central Agencies 
(within Chainnanship of Cabinet Government) Electoral Support 
CabinetjExecutive 
Carmittee 
Central Agencies/ 
Cabinet Secretariats 
Focal Department 
Parliament/ 
Legislative- Legislatures/Councils 
bureaucratic Officers of Parliament; 
Legislatures 
Focal Department 
Judicial- Federal Courts/ 
bureaucratic Provincial Courts 
Focal Department 
Govem.Il'eIlt Departments 
Intergovern- and Institutions at 
External rrental other Levels of 
(outside Govem.Il'eIlt 
GoVem.Il'eIlt) Intergovernmental Bodies 
Govem.Il'eIltal- Focal Department 
nongovernmental Nongovernmental 
Organisations 
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The framework is divided into four vertical columns 
and each column contains a number of horizontal subdivisions. 
Column one lists three broad patterns of interactions. They 
are: 
1. Internal interactions (i.e., interactions within 
a government department--the department selected as the constant 
actor throughout all interactions or the focal department) 
2. External interactions within government (i.e., 
interactions between the focal department and other government 
departments and institutions at the same level of government) 
3. External interactions outside government (i.e., 
interactions between the focal department and government 
departments and institutions at other levels of government as 
well as intergovernmental bodies and nongovernmental organisations) 
The first broad pattern of interactions can also be classed as 
intraorganisational interactions. The other two patterns of 
interaction constitute interorganisational interactions. 
The three broad patterns of interaction are further 
subdivided into seven major categories and listed in column two. 
The seven major categories of interaction are: 
1. Intradepartmental interactions (i.e., interactions 
within the focal department) 
2. Interdepartmental interactions (i.e., interactions 
between the focal department and other departments at the same 
level of government) 
3. Executive-bureaucratic interactions (i.e., 
interactions between the focal department and the executive at 
the same level of government) 
4. Legislative-bureaucratic interactions (i.e., 
interactions between the focal department and the legislature 
at the same level of government) 
5. Judicial-bureaucratic interactions (i.e., interactions 
between the focal department and the courts at the same level of 
government) 
6. Intergovernmental interactions (i.e., interactions 
between the focal department and departments and institutions at 
other levels of government as well as intergovernmental bodies) 
7. Governmental-nongovernmental in~eractions (i.e., 
interactions between the focal department and nongovernmental 
organisations at the same level of government) 
The first category of interaction corresponds to the first 
broad pattern of interaction. Categories two through five 
correspond to the second broad pattern of interaction. The 
last two categories correspond to the third broad pattern of 
interaction. 
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Column three of the framework lists the potential actors 
for each of the seven major categories of interaction. In each 
case, the focal department is included since it is the constant 
actor throughout all the categories of interaction. For example, 
along with the focal department other actors in executive-
bureaucratic interactions are the prime minister, the cabinet 
and central agencies. Column three can be further refined to 
include subunits of various actors (e.g., cabinet--cabinet 
committees, central agencies--Privy Council Office, Treasury 
Board Secretariat.):. Even these subunits can be broken down to 
specify individual actors (e.g., ministers, bureaucrats). 
Column four is reserved for a listing of the power 
resources (i.e., the primary means of control and influence) 
available to the actors involved in each category of interaction. 
The restriction on space does not allow for a comprehensive list 
of the power resources available to all the actors in all the 
interactions. Therefore, only the power resources available to 
the focal department and the prime minister in executive-
bureaucratic interactions are enumerated in Table 1. 
Advantages Associated with the Use of 
Kernaghan's Institutional Framework 
16 
There are certain advantages associated with the use of 
Kernaghan's institutional framework which make it ideal for the 
purpose of this thesis. The most obvious of these advantages is 
that it is designed to focus on interactions between and among 
actors in the policy process. This feature can be easily 
adapted to identify and examine actors and their interactions 
for any number of purposes, including interactions aimed at 
co-ordinating the development and implementation of aging policy. 
The framework also allows for an examination of multiple 
interactions between and among multiple actors and it can be 
applied to all levels of government. This characteristic is 
especially advantageous in tracing the actors involved in 
policy fields without a single governmental or departmental 
home (e.g., aging policy) and in linking their interactions. 
Furthermore, the framework can be used repeatedly from the 
perspectives of different focal departments. It can be 
applied to each department with major program responsibilities 
in the field of aging at each level of government. Since 
Kernaghan's framework draws attention to the importance of 
power in characterising interactions, it lends itself to an 
examination of the role of power in interactions directed at 
co-ordination. This trait ~s particularly useful in view of 
the intention of this thesis to analyse interactions for 
co-ordination in aging policy according to the forms of power 
available to the actors involved. Finally, the institutional 
framework developed by Kernaghan provides a systematic way of 
17 
collecting, ordering and analysing data. For example, it 
allows for the detection of gaps in present efforts to co-
ordinate the development and implementation of policy in the 
field of aging. In respect of the advantages derived from the 
use of the institutional framework, it is employed in this 
thesis to structure the description and evaluation of interactions 
for co-ordination in aging policy_ 
A Modified Version 
Despite the advantages associated with the use of 
Kernaghan's framework, some modifications are desirable given 
the purpose of this thesis. First, it is only used to identify 
and examine those interactions intended for co-ordination in 
the development and implementation of policy in the field of 
aging. The framework was originally created to focus on 
interactions in the policy process. Secondly, the spatial 
arrangement of the framework depicted in Table 1 is rearranged 
to permit a substitution of one column and an addition of another. 
The changes are shown in Table 2. The level of government and 
the focal department appear at the top of the new table. The 
three broad patterns of interaction and the seven major categories 
of interaction are collapsed into column one. The second column 
lists the potential actors for each category of interaction. 
The third column registers the form of power, control and/or 
influence, available to each actor instead of their power 
resources. This substitution allows for a more direct 
examination of the role of power in interactions for the purpose 
of co-ordination. The fourth column characterises interactions 
TABLE 2 18 
Modified Version of Kernaghan I s Institutional Frarrework 
Level of Government--(e.g., Federal Government) 
Focal Department--(e.g., Dept. of National Health and Welfare) 
1 2 
Broad Patterns and 
r1ajor Categories 
of Interaction Actors 
Internal 
Line units 
Intradepartmental Staff Units 
Field Units 
External--Within 
Government 
Interdepartmental 
Executive-
bureaucratic 
Focal Dept. 
other Depts. 
Focal Dept. 
Prime Minister 
Cabinet 
Central Agencies 
3 
Fonn(s) of Power 
Available to 
Actors 
4 
Fonmalisation and 
Intensity of 
Interactions 
Columns thre and four are 
reserved for the last chapter 
of this thes s. 
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according to the variables of formalisation and intensity. 
This addition to the framework is desirable because it provides 
for the creation of comparisons among the categories of 
interaction with respect to present efforts to co-ordinate 
aging policy. Neither the third nor fourth columns are 
completed at this time. They are reserved for the final 
chapter of this thesis. The various modifications noted above 
do not detract from the usefulness of the original framework. 
They do, however, tailor it to meet the needs of this particular 
thesis. 
CHAPTER III 
Interactions for the Purpose of Co-ordination 
in the Field of Aging at the Federal 
Level of Government 
The Federal Government's Role in Aging Policy 
The federal government has a limited role in the field 
of aging. Most of the programs applicable to the elderly 
(e.g., health and social services, transportation, housing) are 
under the constitutional jurisdiction of provincial governments. 
The federal government does, however, provide financial 
assistance to provincial governments for some of these programs 
(e.g., medicare). Programs directly provided by the federal 
government for the aged derive mainly from its activity in the 
f . . t 23 area 0 lncome maln enance. 
The majority of programs provided by the federal 
government specifically for the elderly fall under the general 
rubric of income security. They are: Old Age Security (OAS) , 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), Spouses' Allowance (SPA), 
and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). One other major program 
designed for the aged is the New Horizons Program. It is not 
an income-related program; rather, it provides grants to seniors' 
groups for various social and recreational projects which are 
organised and operated by seniors for the benefit of the 
community. 
20 
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There are several other programs administered by the 
federal government that are applicable to the elderly as part 
of some other clientele (e.g., veterans, handicapped, consumers). 
Some of these are: 
- veterans' benefits 
- grants to provincial transportation 
- projects for the elderly and handicapped 
- general consumer programs 
- the provision of support materials (e.g., 
information, brochures) for physical fitness 
- financial assistance for special housing projects 
- special income tax deductions for the aged 
The Actors 
Public Organisations (i.e., Federal Departments) 
The preceding brief overview of the federal government's 
role in aging policy suggests that despite its limited activity 
in the field of aging many departments are involved. The most 
notable of these departments are: Health and Welfare Canada, 
Veterans Affairs Canada, Transport Canada, Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs, Finance, and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. 
Lola Wilson, Departmental Co-ordinator and Consultant on Aging 
for Health and Welfare Canada, noted that "anything that touches 
society touches the aged," and virtually every federal 
government department is involved in the field of aging in some 
24 
way. 
While many departments are involved in aging policy, 
the extent of their involvement varies. Most departments have 
minor program responsibilities in the field of aging. For 
example, Veterans Affairs Canada administers various benefits 
for veterans and some of these have particular significance for 
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elderly persons (e.g., War Veterans and Civilian War 
Allowances). Transport Canada has a program that provides 
grants to provincial transportation projects for the elderly 
and the handicapped. One department has, however, major 
program responsibilities in the field of aging. The Department 
of National Health and Welfare administers all of the income 
security programs (i.e., OAS, GIS, SPA, and CPP) that apply to 
the elderly and it is also responsible for the New Horizons 
Program which has its own director and staff. The program 
responsibilities of the Department of National Health and 
Welfare suggest that its involvement in aging policy is more 
extensive than any other federal department. In fact, officials 
at the federal level of government indicated that aging policy 
is mainly the responsibility of the Department of National 
Health and Welfare. 
The central role played by Health and Welfare Canada in 
the field of aging is further evidenced by the following: 
- the presence of a Departmental Co-ordinator 
and Consultant on Aging within Health and 
Welfare Canada 
- the creation of an Office on Aging within 
the Department of Health and Welfare 
- the establishment of a Health and Welfare 
Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on 
Aging (i.e., an intradepartmental committee) 
- a newly created National Advisory Council on 
Aging which reports to the Minister of Health 
and Welfare 
No other federal department has devoted such attention to aging 
concerns. Since the Department of National Health and Welfare 
is the major departmental actor in aging policy at the federal 
level of government, it is used in this chapter as the focal 
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department for the purpose of describing and analysing interactions 
aimed at co-ordination. 
Other Actors in the Field of Agin~ 
Government Institutions at the Federal Level 
The executive of government which according to the 
framework used in this thesis includes the prime minister, the 
cabinet, and central agencies is of course active in all policy 
f ' ld ' 1 d' . 25 h h 1 f th le s, lnc u lng aglng. For t e most part, t e ro e 0 e 
executive in aging policy takes place within the larger context 
of social policy (i.e., no cabinet minister, cabinet committee, 
or central agency is solely devoted to aging concerns). 
Within the context of social policy, several subunits and 
individual actors are important to note. They are: 
1. The cabinet--ministers of social policy departments 
(e.g., Health and Welfare Canada, Veterans Affairs Canada, 
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation); Minister of State for 
Social Development 
2. Cabinet committees--Priorities and Planning, Treasury 
Board and the Committee on Social Development 
3. CentraZ agencies--Treasury Board Secretariat, Privy 
Council Office, Federal-Provincial Relations Office and the 
Ministry of State for Social Development 
Some of these actors (i.e., Priorities and Planning Committee, 
Treasury Board and central agencies) are, given their specific 
functions, engaged directly or indirectly in all policy fields 
(e.g., social policy, economic policy). The cabinet as a 
collectivity is also concerned with all the activities of 
government. All of the actors listed, however, have a role in 
aging policy which mainly involves policy planning and resource 
management under the umbrella of social policy. 
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Neither parliament nor the courts (i.e., the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Court) appear to be key actors in the 
field of aging. In one sense, parliament has a minor role in 
that its approval is required for any proposed legislation, 
including proposals which affect the elderly (e.g., new pension 
legislation, mandatory retirement). In another sense, 
parliament can affect aging policy through its exercise of 
various controls over the bureaucracy. There is a parliamentary 
Committee on Health, Welfare, and Social Affairs that deals 
with aging concerns as part of social policy, but it has 
never received a specific mandate to study aging policy. 
This Committee is, however, regularly involved in the "scrutiny 
of the legislation, policies and programmes of the Department 
of National Health and Welfare .•• ", and has from time to 
time during its study of bills that have been referred to it 
or during its regular reviews of government budgetary 
estimates raised questions about various issues in aging 
policy (e.g., old age pensions, the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement) .26 The senate has at least on two occasions in 
recent years had special committees (i.e., the 1966 Special 
Senate Committee on Aging and the 1979 Special Senate Committee 
on Retirement Age POlicies) that focused on aging concerns. 
These committees produced reports (i.e., Final Report of the 
Special Committee on Aging and Retirement Without Tears: A 
Report of the Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age 
Policies) which, among a number of recommendations, included 
a concern for co-ordination in the field of aging. 27 The 
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courts, in view of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, 
do not really have a role in any policy area unless questions 
of jurisdiction (i.e., violations of jurisdiction) or questions 
of law (e.g., error on the face of the record) are involved. 28 
Government Departments and Institutions at Other Levels of 
Government and Intergovernmental Bodies 
Government departments and institutions active in the 
field of aging at the provincial and municipal levels of 
government are discussed separately in Chapters IV and V 
respectively. Chapter VI deals with intergovernmental bodies. 
Nongovernmental Organisations 
At the federal level of government, there are five main 
nongovernmental organisations which have a role in the field of 
. 29 h aglng. T ey are: the National Advisory Council on Aging 
(an advisory council), the Canadian Association on Gerontology 
(a professional association), the National Pensioners and 
Senior Citizens Federation, Canadian Pensioners Concerned 
Incorporated, and the Senior Centres Organisation of Canada 
(three seniors' organisations with pressure/interest group 
roles). Generally, these nongovernmental organisations provide 
research on aging concerns and offer policy recommendations and 
criticisms to the appropriate officials in government (e.g., 
officials in the Department of National Health and Welfare) . 
Each organisation is discussed briefly below. 
The National Advisory Council on Aging was set up by 
Order-in-Council in May 1980 to "assist and advise the Minister 
of National Health and Welfare on matters related to the quality 
of life of elderly Canadians, . . . More specifically, its 
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mandate is "to advise the Minister [of Health and Welfare] on 
existing legislation and programs effecting [sic] senior 
citizens as well as the need for introducing new programs or 
legislation. ,,31 The Council's terms of reference include: 
1. Reviewing the needs and problems of older people 
with the purpose of recommending remedial action 
2. Consulting with national, provincial and local 
associations involved in aging 
3. Publishing reports and stimulating public discussion 
on aging 32 
As indicated by the Council's terms of reference, it is also 
expected to perform a liaison function and work closely with 
other nongovernmental organisations which have an interest in 
the elderly (e.g., Canadian Association on Gerontology, 
Canadian Pensioners Concerned Incorporated, National Pensioners 
and Senior Citizens Federation, and the Senior Centres 
Organisation of Canada). The Council's membership (eighteen 
members in all) is comprised of persons active in national or 
provincial organisations, social scientists, medical experts, 
members of senior citizens' clubs and the general public. Its 
first meeting was held in October of 1980. 
The Canadian Association on Gerontology was founded in 
1971 and incorporated in 1973. It is recognised as the official 
spokesperson for gerontology in Canada. The objectives of the 
Association are: 
1. To bring together persons interested in gerontology 
in the fields of biological sciences, medical sciences, psychology, 
social sciences, social welfare and such others as may be 
appropriate 
2. To promote the study of aging in all its aspects 
3. To promote improvement in the well-being of older 
people 
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4. To strengthen and improve communication between the 
relevant scientific disciplines and between persons engaged in 
research, education, professional practice and other interested 
workers 
5. To promote active financial support for gerontological 
research and the application of its findings in practical 
situations33 
Toward these ends, the Canadian Association on Gerontology: 
- provides a meeting ground for professionals 
in the field of aging, many of whom work for 
federal or provincial governments in some 
capacity (e.g., Provincial Gerontologists or 
Consultants on Aging) 
- makes representations to government 
departments, committees, and other councils 
on the subject of aging (e.g., Health and 
Welfare Canada, Select Senate Committee on 
Retirement Age Policies--Croll Committee, 
Economic Council of Canada) 
- sponsored a national symposium on policies 
for the aged (October 1978) which brought 
together representatives from provincial 
ministries of social services and the 
Department of National Health and Welfare 
The Association's membership, as indicated by its objectives, 
is open to persons "who by virtue of their training or experience 
34 
are interested in some aspect of gerontology." Consequently, 
its members range from architects to social workers. 
The National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation 
was incorporated on May 1, 1954. Its roots started, however, 
in Saskatchewan during the 1940's. The Federation grew out of 
labour organisations and still employs similar tactics in its 
advocacy role in the field of aging. In addition to the 
Federation's national organisation, it has provincial 
affiliates (e.g., the United Senior Citizens of Ontario) in all 
ten provinces. 
The National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation 
is committed to "the responsibility of bringing to the attention 
of governments and other appropriate authorities, the specific 
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needs and concerns of the elderly, .•• "35 More specifically, 
its purposes are: 
1. To act as an advisory body providing central contacts, 
facilities for research, surveys, uniform objectives and a 
national expansion of the pensioners' movement 
2. To stimulate public interest in the welfare of 
senior citizens by means of adequate pensions and social 
security that will provide comfortable housing and decent living 
3. To protect the rights and interests of pensioners 
and prospective pensioners 
4. To prevent discrimination and undue delay in 
granting pensions 
5. To project a social friendly fellowship among the 
pensioners of Canada36 
For these purposes, the Federation holds annual 
conventions for its membership which includes representatives 
from senior citizens' national and provincial organisations, 
senior citizens' clubs and individuals. Problems and needs 
facing the elderly are brought before the convention in the form 
of resolutions. Decisions on resolutions reached at the 
convention are presented to the appropriate federal officials 
"with the view of obtaining legislation beneficial to older 
people. ,,37 In particular, the Federation submits an annual 
brief to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. The 
National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation credits 
itself with the following accomplishments: 
- substantial pension increases 
- national medicare 
- better deals for seniors in housing, 38 
nursing homes, and homes for the aged 
Canadian Pensioners Concerned Incorporated was 
established in 1971 and incorporated in 1974. It has affiliates 
in four provinces (i.e., Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba and Nova 
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Scotia). The goal of Canadian Pensioners Concerned Incorporated 
is "to improve the quality of life for older Canadians . . . who 
are being seriously hurt by inflation, high taxes, [and] inadequate 
health care.,,39 Consequently, this organisation's program for 
action includes: 
- focusing on those elderly persons whose 
incomes are below poverty levels 
- urging the greatest help for the greatest 
need 
- working to protect the financial security 
of the retired 
- informing pensioners of entitlements and 
procedures 
- supporting pre-retirement projects 
- emphasizing the need for home care of the 
elderly 
- urging improved geriatric and community 
health care 40 
Canadian Pensioners Concerned attempts to accomplish its goal 
by researching and providing data on various problems related 
to the needs of the elderly (e.g., pension increases, adequate 
foot care, improved home care services) and presenting reports/ 
briefs to the appropriate government officials (e.g., officials 
in the Department of National Health and Welfare). The 
membership of this organisation is mostly comprised of retired, 
middle-class, white collar workers. As a result, the tactics 
of Pensioners Concerned are significantly different from the 
union orientation of the National Pensioners and Senior Citizens 
Federation although both organisations have similar goals. 
The Senior Centres Organisation of Canada is the 
newest of the three seniors' organisations. Its organisational 
meeting was held on October 13, 1977. This organisation also 
has a number of provincial affiliates (e.g., in Ontario--the 
Senior Centres Association of Ontario or the SCAO). 
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The Senior Centres Organisation has three objectives: 
1. To utilize national resources to the fullest 
possible extent for the benefit of the Organisation and through 
it for senior centres in Canada 
2. To provide a forum for national consultation on 
education, research, policies and standards, and other matters 
of concern to senior centres in order to improve the quality 
of programs and services for senior citiz.ens offered through 
senior centres 
3. To promote the establishment of new senior centres 
in locations where the need for such a development has been 
identified 41 
While the primary focus of this organisation is on senior 
centres (i.e., centres which provide social and recreational 
activities for the elderly), it is also concerned with the 
larger issue of programs for the aged. In this latter capacity, 
the Senior Centre Organisation of Canada appears to act as a 
liaison between the grass-roots seniors and program planners 
in government. For example, members of the organisation work 
hand-in-hand with officials from the Department of National 
Health and Welfare Canada. The membership is comprised of 
representatives from approved (i.e., according to the organisation's 
criteria for acceptance) senior citizen centres in Canada. 
There are other nongovernmental organisations at the 
federal level which have an interest in the elderly, but only 
as part of a larger group (e.g., women, consumers, workers, 
handicapped) . Some of these are: 
- Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women 
- National Action Committee on the Status of Women 
- Canadian Council for Social Development 
- Consumers' Association of Canada 
- Canadian Labour Congress 
- Canadian Rehabilitation Council for the Disabled 
Interactions Aimed at Co-ordination 
in Aging Policy 
Description and Analysis of Interactions 
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Interactions aimed at co-ordination in the field of 
aging at the federal level of government are described under the 
three broad patterns and seven major categories of interaction 
outlined in the previous chapter. Each category of interaction 
is analysed with respectto formalisation, intensity and the 
form(s) of power available to the actors involved. This format 
is also used in the next three chapters. 
Internal interactions 
(within the Department of National Health and Welfare) 
Intradepartmental interactions occur between and among 
several sUbunits and individual actors in the Department of 
National Health and Welfare. 
First, there is an Office on Aging which has recently 
been established in the Policy, Planning and Information Branch 
of Health and Welfare. The Policy, Planning and Information 
Branch itself is the unit responsible for co-ordinating all 
departmental work with respect to policy development. The 
Office on Aging is just in the process of being organised. It 
replaces the former Bureau on Aging and is under the direction 
of the Director of the Task Force on Consultation and Constituency 
Liaison. The main co-ordinating function within the Department 
of National Health and Welfare with respect to aging policy is 
expected to rest with the Office on Aging. It will provide a 
focal point for departmental activities related to aging policy. 
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In this capacity, the Office on Aging will be aided by a 
Departmental (i.e., intradepartmental) Co-ordinating Committee 
on Aging. 
The Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on Aging, whose 
main purpose is to aid in promoting co-ordination of the 
Department's work in aging policy, is presently being established. 
It will be composed of representatives from branches in Health 
and Welfare identified as having aging concerns (e.g., New 
Horizons, Income Security Programs Branch). The specific 
responsibilities of the Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on 
Aging are twofold. They are: 
1. To monitor the degree of consideration that aging 
and the aged are receiving throughout the department 
2. To serve in an advisory capacity to the Deputy 
Minister and Executive Committee on matters pertaining to the 
aged and aging 42 
In addition to the Office on Aging and the Department 
Co-ordinating Committee on Aging, there is also a Departmental 
Co-ordinator/Consultant on Aging. This office is presently 
held by Lola Wilson who apparently will work out of the Office 
on Aging. Her terms of reference are to co-ordinate all activities 
in the Department of National Health and Welfare that bear on 
aging policy. 
Intradepartmental interactions aimed at co-ordination 
in the field of aging occur on a less formal basis as well. In 
addition to the interactions brought about by the existence of 
co-ordinating mechanisms (i.e., Office on Aging, Departmental 
Co-ordinating Committee on Aging, and Departmental Co-ordinator/ 
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Consultant on Aging), departmental officials are encouraged to 
interact with each other to further co-ordination. 
It is difficult to analyse conclusively intradepartmental 
interactions aimed at co-ordination in the field of aging. The 
reasons for this difficulty are twofold. First, a lack of 
specificity in the data provided by key officials from the 
Department of National Health and Welfare precludes detailed 
examination. For example, no specific details were given about 
who interacts with whom in the Department and the frequency of 
this interaction. Secondly, the "newness" of the Office on 
Aging, the Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on Aging, and 
the Departmental Co-ordinator permits only a perfunctory 
examination of their operations. Perhaps the recent establishment 
of these co-ordinating mechanisms explains the lack of specificity 
noted above. Despite these problems, some tentative observations 
can be made. 
Intradepartmental interactions appear to be formalised. 
As indicated in Chapter I of this thesis, the two measures of 
formalisation are: (1) the extent to which interaction for 
co-ordination has received official approval; and, (2) the 
extent to which a co-ordinating mechanism exists between the 
actors involved. Since officials of the Department of National 
Health and Welfare are encouraged to interact with each other 
to further co-ordination, one can assume that such interactions 
are officially sanctioned. The existence of co-ordinating 
mechanisms (i.e., the Office on Aging, the Departmental 
Co-ordinating Committee on Aging, and the Departmental Co-ordinator/ 
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Consultant on Aging) within the Department satisfies the second 
measure of formalisation. 
Intradepartmental interactions also appear to be intense. 
Intensity is indicated by: (1) the extent of the resources 
required by the interaction (i.e., the size of the resource 
investment); and, (2) the frequency of interaction. The very 
existence of co-ordinating mechanisms requires an investment 
of resources (i.e., personnel, time, funds). The existence of 
co-ordinating mechanisms is also likely to result in frequent 
interaction. Therefore, both measures of intensity are satisfied. 
Both forms of power (i.e~, control and influence) are 
used in intradepartmental interactions aimed at co-ordination 
in aging policy. The form of power available depends on which 
subunits and individual actors are involved in the interactions. 
The Minister of Health and Welfare, as the political head of 
the department, possesses hierarchical authority over all other 
departmental officials. Hence, she can exercise control as 
well as influence in intradepartmental interactions. The three 
co-ordinating mechanisms discussed previously have no program 
responsibilities or line control. They serve in an advisory 
capacity and, consequently, are only able to use influence vis-
a-vis other departmental officials. Since members of the 
Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on Aging are representatives 
of departmental branches identified as having aging concerns 
and some of these branches (e.g., Income Security Programs 
Branch) have program responsibilities, these members depending 
on their rank in the department hierarchy, might be able to 
exercise both control and influence in their respective branches. 
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External interactions witlrin government (between the Department 
of National Health and Welfare and other government departments 
and institutions at the same level of government) 
Interdepartmental interactions occur between the 
Department of National Health and Welfare and other social 
policy departments both at the ministerial and bureaucratic 
level. Many of these interactions are directed at co-ordinating 
social policy proposals within the context of the new policy 
and expenditure management system. Aging policy proposals fall 
under the social policy envelope. Consequently, they are 
covered by the more general orientation of the above interactions. 
At the ministerial level, all ministers of health, 
welfare and social services departments meet once a year to 
discuss aging as it relates to other matters (e.g., income 
security). These meetings are formal (i.e., officially 
approved), but they are not facilitated by a co-ordinating 
mechanism (e.g., a ministerial committee on aging). Similar 
meetings occur amonq public servants from the same departments. 
Other interdepartmental interactions are facilitated by 
interdepartmental committees comprised of nonelected officials. 
The Committee of Deputy Ministers of Social Policy Departments 
and the Co-ordinating Committee of Deputy Ministers (or the 
Senior Co-ordinating Committee) are especially important. 
The Committee of Deputy Ministers of Social Policy 
Departments (i.e., an interdepartmental sectoral or policy 
committee) is one of several deputy minister committees which 
are part of a support system for the new policy and expenditure 
management system and the cabinet committee system. Deputy 
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minister committees "provide a forum for testing the adequacy 
and timeliness of [policy] proposals and a mechanism for 
encouraging the resolution of issues not requiring referral 
to the Cabinet Committees . .,43 They "ensure that the necessary 
coordination in the preparation of [policy] proposals has taken 
place and that the essential information is made available to 
the Cabinet Committees. ,,44 Hence, deputy minister committees 
function as co-ordinating mechanisms. They facilitate interactions: 
(1) between and among deputy ministers of different departments; 
and, (2) between departments and cabinet committees. 
The Committee of Deputy Ministers of Social Policy 
Departments, in particular, provides a forum for interaction 
between the Department of National Health and Welfare and other 
social policy departments (e.g., Veterans Affairs, Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation). The Committee is chaired 
by the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of State for Social 
Development. It considers all social policy proposals, 
including aging proposals, before they go to the appropriate 
cabinet committee (i.e., the Committee on Social Development). 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Deputy Ministers has also 
been referred to as the Senior Co-ordinating Committee. It 
is one of the key co-ordinators of the federal bureaucracy. 
The Committee is chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet and 
other members include senior deputy ministers (i.e., Deputy 
Minister of Finance, Secretaries of the Treasury Board and of 
the Ministries of State for Social and Economic Development, 
and the Under Secretary of External Affairs). Generally, the 
Co-ordinating Committee of Deputy Ministers "'mirrors' the 
Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning [the central 
co-ordinating committee of cabinet] and handles significant 
cross-sectoral issues. n45 Its handling of cross-sectoral 
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policy issues is particularly important for aging policy because 
some departments with minor program responsibilities vis-a-vis 
the elderly do not fall within the social policy envelope (e.g., 
Transport Canada, Consumer and Corporate Affairs) . 
In addition to ministerial and bureaucratic inter-
departmental meetings, other interdepartmental interactions 
occur on a less formal basis. It is the responsibility of 
personnel in each branch of Health and Welfare to interact with 
other federal departments to further co-ordination. For example, 
there are interactions between the Income Security Programs 
Branch of Health and Welfare and the Department of Finance on 
aging matters. The Department of National Health and Welfare's 
Office on Aging is also expected to interact with other departments 
involved in the field of aging. 
Interdepartmental interactions appear to be both 
formalised and intense. They are officially approved (e.g., 
officials from the Department of National Health and Welfare 
are officially encouraged to interact on an interdepartmental 
basis to further co-ordination). In addition, two co-ordinating 
mechanisms (i.e., the Committee of Deputy Ministers of Social 
Policy Departments and the Co-ordinating Committee of Deputy 
Ministers), in particular, exist to facilitate interaction 
between and among the relevant departments for the purpose of 
co-ordination. The existence of co-ordinating mechanisms indicates 
a sizable investment of resources (e.g., time, personnel) and 
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makes frequency of interaction more likely (e.g., the 
Committee of Deputy Ministers of Social Policy Departments meets 
bimonthly or weekly depending on its workload). It should be 
noted that there is no federal interdepartmental committee 
devoted solely to aging policy (i.e., an interdepartmental 
committee on aging). Perhaps this observation is linked to 
the fact that, at least on an interdepartmental basis, aging 
policy is generally considered within the larger context of 
social policy. 
Influence is the only form of power available to actors 
in interdepartmental interactions. No one department or official 
from a department has hierarchical authority over other 
departments and their officials. Control can, therefore, not 
be used by actors in interdepartmental interactions. Some 
actors might be, however, more influential in these interactions 
than other actors. 
Executive-bureaucratic interactions occur between the 
Department of National Health and Welfare and the cabinet, 
cabinet committees and central agencies. All of the interactions 
described under this category of interaction are directed at 
co-ordinating aging policy within the context of social policy. 
Furthermore, they are largely concerned with policy development 
and resource allocation. 
The minister of National Health and Welfare interacts 
with other ministers, a majority of whom are department heads, 
at cabinet meetings. Cabinet meetings provide a forum for 
interaction for all department heads especially those with 
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similar policy concerns (e.g., aging policy). While not all 
of these interactions involve a deliberate effort to co-ordinate, 
many of them do. Even the norms of cabinet solidarity and 
collective responsibility bring an overall coherence to the 
activities of government and this also applies to aging policy. 
In a more cynical vein, Stanyer and Smith in reference to the 
British cabinet argue that "Cabinet co-ordination consists of 
ministers defending the interests of their own departments 
against the threatened encroachment of others."46 
Beyond the cabinet, there are cabinet committees which 
facilitate interaction at the ministerial level. Three of 
these committees have particular relevance for aging policy. 
They are: the Priorities and Planning Committee, the Treasury 
Board and the Committee on Social Development (previously known 
as the Committee on Social and Native Affairs) . 
The Committee on Social Development is a policy committee 
of cabinet. It is chaired by the Minister of State for Social 
Development and its membership includes the Minister of National 
Health and Welfare as well as ministers from other social policy 
departments. Generally, the ministerial interactions facilitated 
by the Committee are for the purpose of managing the social policy 
field. This management, among other things, involves co-ordinating 
social policy (i.e., new program proposals and existing programs) 
with respect to government priorities and the funds available 
for the policy sector. Since aging policy falls under the 
umbrella of social policy, the Committee on Social Development 
is the cabinet committee with initial responsibility for policy 
in the field of aging. 
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The Treasury Board has been called a "major management 
committee" and the "expenditure committee" of the cabinet. 47 
Its membership consists of the President of the Treasury Board, 
the Minister of Finance and four other cabinet ministers. The 
Treasury Board's role in recent years has been altered. It 
still functions like a board of management for the government, 
but the Treasury Board shares expenditure responsibilities with 
the policy committees of cabinet and the Ministries of State for 
Social and Economic Development as a result of the new policy 
and expenditure management system. For example, the Treasury 
Board manages the current year finances; however, broad 
allocations for departments and programs within a policy field 
are made by the approprite cabinet policy committee. 
The alteration of the Treasury Board's role vis-a-vis 
expenditure management has shifted the nature of its interactions. 
Prior to the new system of policy and expenditure management, 
the Treasury Board primarily interacted directly with operating 
departments. Now, some of its interactions are with the policy 
committees of cabinet. This shift is a result of the policy and 
expenditure management system's effort to integrate the policy 
and budgetary processes. 
In respect of aging policy (i.e., within the context 
of social policy), the Treasury Board's altered role means that 
it interacts with both the Department of Health and Welfare and 
the cabinet Committee on Social Development. In each case, the 
interactions are aimed at co-ordinating social policy (i. e., new 
programs and existing programs) with financial considerations 
(i.e., the funds available for the social policy field). 
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The Priorities and Planning Committee is the central 
committee of cabinet and it functions much like an inner 
cabinet. The Committee is chaired by the prime minister and its 
membership includes the Minister of Finance, the President of 
the Treasury Board, chairpersons of the cabinet policy committees 
and several other ministers. In the new policy and expenditure 
management system, the Priorities and Planning Committee is 
responsible "for setting the overall direction for government 
policy including the establishment of the fiscal plan and the 
determination of resource envelopes for each Policy Committee. ,,48 
The Committee is also the "forum for the consideration of 
f d 1 ,,- 1 ' 11 h f h' h . . ,,49 e era -provlncla lssues as we as ot er areas 0 19 prlorlty. 
The Priorities and Planning Committee facilitates 
interactions among the most important and influential cabinet 
ministers. Generally, these interactions are for the purpose 
of co-cordinating the work of the entire cabinet committee system. 
All roads do lead to the Priorities and Planning Committee. As 
a result, the policy and expenditure decisions of other cabinet 
committees, including decisions related to aging policy, filter 
ultimately through the Priorities and Planning Committee. For 
example, the chairperson of the cabinet Committee on Social 
Development, which has initial responsibility for aging policy, 
is a member of the Priorities and Planning Committee. 
In addition to the interactions facilitated by the 
cabinet and cabinet committees, executive~bureaucratic inter-
actions also occur between central agencies and the Department 
of National Health and Welfare. In this thesis, central agencies 
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are viewed as staff supports for the cabinet and its committees. 
They are not treated as central controZ agencies. Consequently, 
central agencies include: the Privy Council Office, the Prime 
Minister's Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the 
Federal-Provincial Relations Office. 
Generally, interactions between central agencies and 
all operating departments are part of the staff function 
performed by central agencies for the cabinet and cabinet 
committees. For example, the Treasury Board Secretariat, in 
the new policy and expenditure management system, keeps track 
of current and projected expenditures for each policy field 
and advises the Priorities and Planning Committee on the financial 
requirements from year to year. In order to perform this function, 
the Treasury Board Secretariat interacts with all operating 
departments, including the Department of National Health and 
Welfare. Since co-ordination is an integral part of the staff 
function, it is likely that many of the interactions between 
central agencies and operating departments are aimed at 
co-ordination. This likelihood applies to interactions between 
central agencies and the Department of National Health and 
Welfare on aging matters. 
The Ministry of State for Social Development is another 
actor in interactions between Health and Welfare and the 
executive of government. The Ministry of State for Social 
Development along with the Ministry of State for Economic 
Development are two new government structures. They are an 
integral part of the new system of policy and expenditure 
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management. Although they are called ministries of state, 
these two new government structures function as central agencies 
for their respective policy fields. Each of them is attached 
to a policy committee of cabinet. The Ministries of State for 
Social and Economic Development generally "provide the support 
secretariats for their respective Cabinet Committees." SO For 
example, they screen policy proposals from departments within 
their policy fields before the proposals are passed on to the 
appropriate cabinet committee for consideration. This scrutiny 
of policy proposals requires interaction between the Ministries 
of State and departments. The purpose of this interaction is 
to co-ordinate policy initiatives. More specifically, the 
Ministry of State for Social Development provides the support 
secretariat for the cabinet Committee on Social Development and 
the former interacts with all social policy departments, including 
Health and Welfare, in order to co-ordinate social policy 
proposals which take in aging policy initiatives. 
Interactions between central agencies and the Department 
of National Health and Welfare also occur through the forum of 
interdepartmental committee meetings. Interdepartmental committees 
are viewed as "the principal means of communication and deliberation 
in the federal bureaucratic establishment." S1 Officials from 
central agencies regularly attend interdepartmental committee 
meetings and some even act as chairpersons. The meetings, 
therefore, provide opportunities for executive-bureaucratic 
interaction aimed at co-ordination. In particular, the Committee 
of Deputy Ministers of Social Policy Departments (an interdepartmental 
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committee) facilitates interactions between the Ministry of 
State for Social Development (a central agency) and the 
Department of National Health and Welfare. The Deputy Secretary 
of the Ministry of State for Social Development chairs Committee 
meetings which are also attended by Health and Welfare officials. 
On the basis of the preceding evidence, executive-
bureaucratic interactions, regardless of the subunits and 
individual actors involved, appear to be both formalised and 
intense. All of the interactions described are officially 
approved. In addition, they are facilitated by a number of 
co-ordinating mechanisms. The cabinet, cabinet committees and 
central agencies are actors in executive-bureaucratic interactions 
but they also function as co-ordinating mechanisms for these 
interactions. For example, the cabinet facilitates interactions 
between the Minister of Health and Welfare and other ministers 
with program responsibilities in the field of aging, and many of 
these interactions are directed at co-ordination. The existence 
of co-ordinating mechanisms indicates a significant investment 
of resources (e.g., time, personnel, funds) and provides for 
frequency of interaction (e.g., the cabinet and cabinet committees 
meet on a regular basis). Despite the formalisation and intensity 
of executive-bureaucratic interactions, there is no co-ordinating 
mechanism exclusively devoted to aging policy (e.g., a cabinet 
committee on aging) in this category of interaction. Like the 
interdepartmental interactions described previously, executive-
bureaucratic interactions focus on co-ordinating aging policy 
within the larger context of social policy. Perhaps this more 
general orientation of executive-bureaucratic interactions 
explains the absence of a co-ordinating mechanism concerned 
solely with policy in the field of aging. 
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Generally, influence is the only form of power available 
to actors in executive-bureaucratic interactions. Many of 
these interactions occur between and among cabinet ministers. 
Since all ministers are supposedly equals, control cannot be 
used. This is not to suggest that all ministers are equally 
influential. Some ministers (e.g., the prime minister, heads 
of important cabinet portfolios) are by virtue of their power 
resources (e.g., position in the governing party, personal 
capabilities) more influential than others. In effect, their 
exercise of influence can have the same impact as the exercise 
of control. 52 For example, the Priorities and Planning Committee 
is comprised of the most influential cabinet ministers (the 
prime minister, the Minister of Finance, the President of the 
Treasury Board, chairpersons of the cabinet policy committees 
and several other ministers) and its actions have the practical 
effect of the use of control. Interactions between central 
agencies and the Department of National Health and Welfare, 
as well as all departments, also involve the exercise of 
influence. Central agencies are staff agencies that exist apart 
from the work units. (Le., departments) of government. They 
possess no hierarchical authority over departments and, 
consequently, are unable to exercise control. Central agencies 
do, however, exercise enormous influence vis-a.-vis departments 
especially when they act in the name of their minister (e.g., the 
President of the Treasury Board). Their influence can have the 
same impact as control. 
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Legislative-bureaucratic and judicial-bureaucratic 
interactions are not for the purpose of co-ordinating aging 
policy. In the first place, neither parliament nor the courts 
is a major actor in aging policy. Secondly, any interactions 
between the focal department and either the House of Commons or 
the courts are not aimed at co-ordination. For example, the 
Minister and Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare interact 
with the parliamentary Committee on Health, Welfare and Social 
Affairs during the latter's annual examination of the department's 
budgetary estimates, but this interaction is directed at 
parliamentary control over the bureaucracy. Judicial-bureaucratic 
interactions are also for the purpose of exercising judicial 
control over the bureaucracy. 
Since legislative-bureaucratic and judicial-bureaucratic 
interactions are not for co-ordination in aging policy, they are 
neither formalised nor intense. Formalisation and intensity, 
as they are used in this thesis, only pertain to interactions 
specifically intended for co-ordination. 
Generally, parliament and the courts exercise control 
over departments, while the latter can only reciprocate with the 
use of influence. There are, however, factors that mitigate the 
ability of both parliament and the courts to effectively exercise 
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control over the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the power 
resources (e.g., expertise, experience) of departments enable 
them to exercise a great deal of influence in legislative-
bureaucratic and judicial-bureaucratic interactions. 
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External interactions outside government (between the Department 
of National Health and Welfare and government departments and 
institutions at other levels of government as well as 
intergovernmental bodies/between the Department of National 
Health and Welfare and nongovernmental organisations at the 
federal level) 
Intergovernmental interactions are discussed separately 
in Chapter Vi of this thesis. 
Governmental-nongovernmental interactions occur between 
the Department of National Health and Welfare and the five main 
nongovernmental organisations (i.e., the National Advisory 
Council on Aging, the Canadian Association on Gerontology, the 
National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation, Canadian 
Pensioners Concerned Incorporated and the Senior Centres 
Organisation of Canada) involved in the field of aging at 
the federal level. Generally, these interactions are for the 
purpose of information exchange. The nongovernmental organisations 
noted above basically provide research on aging concerns and offer 
policy recommendations to the Department of National Health and 
Welfare. For example, the National Advisory Council on Aging 
reports to the Minister of Health and Welfare in an advisory 
capacity. 
From the brief preceding description of governmental-
nongovernmental interactions, it is clear that these interactions 
are not aimed at co-ordination. While information exchange is 
necessary for co-ordination, all exchanges of information do not 
necessarily involve an attempt to bring parts into proper 
relation. An exchange of information can be an activity or end 
in itself. As noted in Chapter I of this thesis, interactions for 
co-ordination go beyond a mere exchange of information. They involve 
a deliberate effort to co-ordinate. 
It is important to note, however, that the five 
nongovernmental organisations described in this chapter are 
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key actors in the field of aging and, consequently, they can be 
instrumental in developing interactions for the purpose of co-
ordination. For example, they might convey the need for more 
or improved co-ordination to the appropriate government officials 
and request the creation of a new co-ordinating mechanism devoted 
entirely to aging policy. Some analysis of existing governmental-
nongovernmental interactions is, therefore, warranted. 
While existing governmental-nongovernmental interactions 
are not directed at co-ordination in aging policy, these inter-
actions are officially approved. For example, the Department 
of National Health and Welfare's Office on Aging is expected to 
interact with key nongovernment.al organisations involved in the 
field of aging. Individual officials from each branch of Health 
and Welfare are also responsible for interacting with these 
organisations on a less formal basis to further co-operation. 
Some of this latter interaction is facilitated through membership 
on or appearances before nongovernmental organisations. 
Existing governmental-nongovernmental interactions are 
frequent. Interactions occur, in a variety of ways, on a fairly 
regular basis. The most obvious illustration of this regularity 
is where departmental officials interact with nongovernmental 
organisations as a result of their membership on these 
organisations.. Governmental-nongovernmental interactions do 
appear to be, however, less frequent than intradepartmental, 
interdepartmental or executive-bureaucratic interactions. 
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The form of power available to actors in governmental-
nongovernmental interactions is, for the most part, influence. 
Control based on the possession of legal-rational authority 
cannot be used because there is no hierarchical (i.e., superior-
subordinate) relationship between the Department of National 
Health and Welfare and the five nongovernmental organisations 
discussed. If a broader definition of control is adopted, one 
could argue that the Department is able to exercise control over 
nongovernmental organisations. This argument is based on its 
ability to: 
1. Financially assist nongovernmental organisations 
(e.g., provide funds to the National Advisory Council on Aging) 
2. Accept or reject recommendations from nongovernmental 
organisations. 
3. Develop policy proposals that are favourable to 
nongovernmental organisations 
4. Provide useful information on aging concerns to 
nongovernmental organisations 
On the other hand, the above four factors can be viewed as potent 
power resources enabling the Department of National Health and 
Welfare to wield a great deal of influence vis-~-vis nongovernmental 
organisations. Nongovernmental organisations are, however, not 
without their own power resources. They can provide information 
on aging concerns and give valuable support to departmental 
programs. In other words, nongovernmental organisations can be 
very influential in interactions with the Department of National 
Health and Welfare. 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described and analysed interactions 
aimed at co-ordinating aging policy at the federal level of 
government. 
The first part of the chapter outlined the federal 
government's role in the field of aging and the major actors 
involved. It was noted that the federal government had a 
limited role in aging policy, which derived mainly from its 
activity in the area of income maintenance, and that some actors 
(i.e., the Department of National Health and Welfare, the 
executive of government and five nongovernmental organisations) 
were more involved in this policy field than others (i.e., other 
federal departments, parliament, the courts and nongovernmental 
organisations with an interest in a broader based clientele) . 
The main part of the chapter focused on interactions for 
co-ordination in aging policy. These interactions usually took 
place within the larger context of social policy. Several major 
categories of interaction were examined from the perspective of 
the focal department, the Department of National Health and 
Welfare. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the description 
and analysis of these interactions. 
Three categories of interaction appear to be formalised. 
They are: intradepartmental, interdepartmental and executive-
bureaucratic interactions. In each case, interactions for the 
purpose of co-ordination are officially approved and several 
co-ordinating mechanisms exist to facilitate them. Of the three 
categories of interaction, executive-bureaucratic interactions 
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seem to be the most formalised. Neither intradepartmental nor 
interdepartmental interactions are facilitated by as many co-
ordinating mechanisms as those operative in executive-bureaucratic 
interactions (i.e., the cabinet, cabinet committees and central 
agencies) . 
Legislative-bureaucratic, judicial-bureaucratic and 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions are not formalised. 
While interactions between the focal department and other actors 
in these categories of interaction do occur, they are not directed 
at co-ordination in the field of aging. The variable of 
formalisation only applies to interactions for co-ordination. 
Consequently, interactions in each of the above categories 
cannot be considered formalised. 
Three categories of interaction--intradepartmental, 
interdepartmental and executive-bureaucratic interactions--appear 
to be intense. The existence of co-ordinating mechanisms in 
each of these categories indicates a sizable investment of resources. 
Time, money and personnel are required for the operation of 
co-ordinating mechanisms. The existence of co~ordinating 
mechanisms also provides for frequency of interaction. For 
example, interdepartmental committees, the cabinet and cabinet 
committees meet on a regular basis. Of the three categories of 
interaction, executive-bureaucratic interactions seem to be the 
most intense. The numerous co-ordinating mechanisms that exist 
to facilitate executive-bureaucratic interactions demand a 
greater investment of resources than the fewer mechanisms 
operative in intradepartmental and interdepartmental interactions. 
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Legislative-bureaucratic, judicial-bureaucratic and 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions are not intense. 
While there might be frequency of interaction in the above 
categories, the interactions are not for co-ordination. The 
variable of intensity only pertains to interactions directed 
at co-ordination. 
The form of power available to the actors engaged in 
interactions for the purpose of co-ordinating aging policy 
varies depending on the particular subunits and individuals 
involved in each category of interaction. Generally, 
intraorganisational (i.e., intradepartmental) interactions 
involve the exercise of both control and influence, while 
interorganisational (i.e., interdepartmental and executive-
bureaucratic) interactions involve the use of influence. 
Several other conclusions are noteworthy. First, most 
interactions for co-ordination in aging policy at the federal 
level of government occur within the broader context of social 
policy. Both the interdepartmental and executive-bureaucratic 
interactions described in this chapter are more generally focused 
on co-ordinating social policy_ Efforts to co-ordinate aging 
policy occur within this more general orientation. Only 
intradepartmental interactions are exclusively concerned with 
policy in the field of aging. Secondly, co-ordinating mechanisms 
devoted solely to aging policy only exist in the Department of 
National Health and Welfare. There are no interdepartmental 
committees, cabinet committees or central agencies on aging. 
This conclusion is consistent with the one noted above. Thirdly, 
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most interactions aimed at co-ordination in the field of aging 
appear to occur in the executive-bureaucratic category of inter-
action. None of the other categories of interaction described 
in this chapter has as high a degree of formalisation and 
intensity. In fact, one official from the Department of 
National Health and Welfare indicated that a large measure of 
co-ordination in aging policy occurs at the cabinet committee 
level. 54 Finally, interactions for co-ordination generally 
seem to be concerned with policy development and resource 
allocation. No information was provided on interactions for the 
purpose of co-ordinating the implementation of programs for the 
elderly. The implications of this absence are drawn out in the 
last chapter of the thesis. 
CHAPTER IV 
Interactions for the Purpose of Co-ordination 
in the Field of Aging at the Provincial 
Level of Government 
A Qualification 
In this chapter, the ten provincial governments are 
treated collectively and comparatively. A separate and detailed 
treatment of each province would require a much lengthier study 
than can be provided in this thesis. 
The Provincial Government's Role in Aging Policy 
Provincial governments, unlike their federal counterpart, 
have a very extensive role in the field of aging. As noted in 
the previous chapter, most of the programs applicable to the 
elderly (e.g., health and social services, housin~ transportation) 
are under the constitutional jurisdiction (i.e., Section 92 of 
the British North America Act) of provincial governments. Some 
of these programs are partially financed by other levels of 
government (i.e., federal and local governments). Responsibility 
for program delivery and the development of particular programs 
within a broader program area (e.g., daily telephone, postal 
security alert as part of community-based programs for the 
elderly) is sometimes delegated to municipal or local governments. 
The ultimate authority for these programs rests, however, with 
the provincial governments. 
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Unlike federal programs which mainly focus on income 
security, provincial programs applicable to the aged are very 
diverse. These programs generally include some version of the 
following: 
- income assistance (e.g., provincial supplements to 
the federal government's Guaranteed Income Supplement 
and Spouses' Allowance) 
housing (e.g., homes for the aged, senior citizens' 
apartments) 
- health (e.g., nursing homes, home health care) 
- social (e.g., provincial grants for senior 
citizens' recreational centres) 
- transportation (e.g., reduced bus fare for 
seniors) 
- provincial income tax deductions (e.g., property 
tax rebate for seniors who own homes) 
These diverse programs can generally be placed into two main 
categories. Those which involve institutionalisation of the 
elderly are institution-based. Others, which apply to the 
aged living on their own in the community, are community-based. 
In the past, institution-based programs were the main focus of 
provincial government activity in terms of human and financial 
resources. The emphasis has recently shifted in all provinces 
to maintaining the independence of elderly persons and stressing 
community-based services. 
Generally, similar kinds of programs (i.e., institution 
and community based) are available to the aged in all ten 
provinces. There is, however, significant variation among the 
provinces in the extent to which these programs are developed. 
For example, Ontario has a well developed range of community-
based programs for the elderly whereas Newfoundland is just 
beginning to develop programs in this area. 
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Most of the programs for the aged which fall under 
provincial jurisdiction (e.g., nursing homes, meals':"'on-wheels) 
are not exclusively limited to them. The elderly are numerically 
the largest single group to avail themselves of these programs. 
Often, however, the aged are part of some other clientele (e.g., 
~nvalids, low income persons). 
The Actors 
Public organisations (i.e., provincial departments) 
The preceding overview of the provincial government's 
role in aging policy suggests that many departments are active 
in this policy field. In fact, responsibility for aging policy 
is parcelled out, albeit in varying degrees, to many provincial 
departments. The departments involved in each province are 
usually some version of: culture and recreation, education, 
health, housing, labour, revenue, social services, and transportation. 
Most of these departments have minor program responsibilities vis-
a-vis the aged. For example, departments of culture and 
recreation provide grants and/or assistance to senior citizens' 
organisations for recreational activities. various housing 
commissions administer low income housing for seniors. In most 
provinces, however, two departments have major program 
responsibilities in the field of aging: the departments/ 
ministries of social services and health. The precise names of 
the major departmental actors for each province are provided 
in Table 3 of this thesis. Prince Edward Island and Quebec are 
the only provinces which combine both health and social services 
in one department (i.e., the Department of Health and Social 
Services and the Ministry of Social Affairs). 
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TABLE 3 
Major(Key) Departmental Actors in the Field of Aging 
For Each Provincial Government 
Province 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
Newfoundland 
Nova Scotia 
Ontario 
Prince Edward Island 
Quebec 
Saskatchewan 
Major (Key) Department Actor(s) 
- Department of Social Services 
and Community Health 
- Department of Hospitals and 
Medical Care 
- Ministry of Human Resources 
- Ministry of Health 
- Department of Community Services 
and Corrections 
- Department of Health 
- Department of Social Services 
- Department of Health 
- Department of Social Services 
- Department of Health 
- Department of Social Services 
- Department of Health 
- Ministry of Community and 
Social Services 
- Ministry of Health 
- Department of Health and 
Social Services 
- Ministry of Social Affairs 
- Department of Social Services 
- Department of Health 
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The central role played by provincial departments of 
social services and health is usually further evidenced by the 
presence of a special unit and/or office on aging concerns within 
th ' ., 55 elr organlsatlon. The special unit and/or office and their 
horne department for each province is listed in Table 4 of this 
thesis. Major departmental actors in seven provinces have a 
special unit on aging. Most of these units are located in 
departments of social services. Three provinces have an office 
on aging concerns. The office is known as the Provincial 
Gerontologist or the Consultant on Gerontology. The Provincial 
Gerontologist (or Consultant on Gerontology) usually works out 
of a department of health. One province, Ontario, has an 
additional office on aging concerns. Its Ministry of Community 
and Social Services has a number of regional Program Consultants 
on Senior Citizens Services. Only two provinces have both a 
special unit and an office on aging. Two other provinces have 
neither a unit nor an office on aging in their departments of 
health and social services. (See Table 4 for details.) Because 
of the central role played by departments of social services and 
health in the field of aging, they are used as the focal 
departments for the purpose of describing and analysing interactions 
aimed at co-ordination. 
Other actors in the field of aging 
Government institutions at the provincial level 
The executive of government (i.e., the premier, the 
cabinet and provincial secretariats) in each province is active 
in aging policy. Generally, this activity takes place within the 
TABLE 4 
Special Unit/Division and/or Office Devoted to Aging Concerns According to 
Province and Major(Key) Departmental Actor(s) 
Province 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
NewfOlll1dland 
Nova Scotia 
Ontario 
Maj or (Key) Depart:rrentalActor (s) 
- Dept. of Social Services 
and Carmunity Health 
- Dept. of Hospitals and 
Medical Care 
- Ministry of Human Resources 
- Ministry of Health 
- Dept. of Carmunity Services 
and Corrections 
- Dept. of Health 
- Dept. of Social Services 
- Dept. of Health 
- Dept. of Social Services 
- Dept. of Health 
- Dept. of Social Services 
- Dept. of Health 
- Ministry of Carmuni ty and 
Social Services 
- Ministry of Health 
Prince Edward Island - Dept. of Health and Social 
Services 
Quebec - Ministry of Social Affairs 
Saskatchewan - Dept. of Social Services 
- Dept. of Health 
Sp§cial Unit/Division 
Senior Citizens Bureau 
Aged Services 
Division of Services 
to Senior Citizens 
Adult Services Division 
Division of Services 
to the Aging 
Un Service Des Politiques 
for Adult and Elderly 
Persons 
Senior Citizens Branch 
Office 
Consultant on Gerontology 
Consultant on Gerontology 
Program Consultants on Senior 
Citizens Services 
Provincial Gerontologist U1 1.0 
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context of a broader policy area (e.g., social services, community 
services and/or health services) and mainly involves policy 
planning and resource management. Only one province, Nova Scotia, 
has a subunit within the executive of government that is 
concerned solely with aging policy_ This subunit is the Senior 
Citizens Secretariat, a cabinet committee. Apart from this 
anomaly, the same kinds of actors evident in the executive of 
the federal government are involved in the field of aging at 
the provincial level. They are: 
1. The cabinet or executive committee--ministers of 
social services and health and other ministers whose departments 
have program responsibilities vis-a-vis the aged; the Provincial 
Secretary for Social Development in Ontario and a similar 
minister in charge of the Ministry of State for Social Development 
in Quebec 
2. Cabinet committees--a central co-ordinating committee 
(e.g., Alberta's Priorities Committee, Prince Edward Island's 
Policy and Priorities Board); a treasury or management board; a 
social policy committee (e.g., Quebec and Ontario's Committee on 
Social Development) or in the case of Nova Scotia an aging policy 
committee (i.e., Senior Citizens Secretariat) 
3. Cabinet secretariats (e.g., Secretariat to the Planning 
and Priorities Board in Ontario) 
Neither provincial legislatures nor provincial courts 
appear to be key actors in the field of aging. One province, 
Alberta, has a legislative (caucus) Committee on Senior Citizens. 
Its primary responsibility is to be in contact with the public 
and make general recommendations on policy direction in the field 
of aging. 56 In the mid 1960's, the province of Ontario had a 
legislative Select Committee on Aging. Other than these two 
examples, there is no evidence to indicate that either the 
legislatures or the courts are active in aging policy. 
Government departments and institutions at other levels of 
government and intergovernmental bodies 
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Government departments and institutions active in the 
field of aging at the federal and municipal levels of government 
are described separately in Chapters III and V respectively. 
Intergovernmental bodies are dealt with in Chapter VI. 
Nongovernmental organisations 
There are several nongovernmental organisations in each 
province that have a role in aging policy. Generally, they 
include: provincial advisory councils on aging, provincial 
associations on gerontology and senior citizens' organisations. 
Six provinces have advisory councils on aging (i.e., Alberta, 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan). Many 
provinces have provincial associations on gerontology (e.g., 
British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan). 
These provincial associations are not yet affiliated with the 
Canadian Association on Gerontology. The major senior citizens' 
organisations at the provincial level are affiliates of the 
National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation, Canadian 
Pensioners Concerned, and the Senior Centre Organisation of 
Canada. These provincial affiliates are not present in all ten 
provinces (e.g., Canadian Pensioners Concerned Incorporated only 
has affiliates in Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia) • 
They do, however, have the same kind of membership, objectives 
and tactics as their national organisations. The basic difference 
between the national and provincial organisations is that they 
channel their activities in separate political arenas (i.e., 
provincial affiliates work at the provincial level and interact 
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with provincial departments of social services and health) • 
There are also nongovernmental organisations involved 
in aging policy that are unique to each province. Some of these 
are: 
Province 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Manitoba 
Newfoundland 
Saskatchewan 
Nongovernmental Organisation 
Alberta Council on Aging 
(distinct from the Provincial 
Senior Citizens Advisory Council) 
Social Planning and Review 
Council of British Columbia 
(in particular its Committee 
on Aging) 
Age and Opportunity Centre 
Manitoba Society of Seniors 
The Newfoundland and Labrador 
Association for the Aging 
Action Now 
The organisations listed above are those identified in 
correspondence with government officials. 
There might be other nongovernmental organisations 
at the provincial level which have an interest in the qged 
as part of some other clientele (e.g., the blind or handicapped), 
but no specific information was provided about them. 
For the most part, the role of all provincial nongovern-
mental organisations active in the field of aging is to provide 
information and research on aging concerns to seniors in their 
communities, the general public and the appropriate government 
officials (i.e., officials from the departments of social 
services and health). They often perform a liaison function 
between the elderly and the general public, and between the 
elderly and government officials. In addition, nongovernmental 
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organisations involved in aging policy offer policy 
recommendations to the relevant government authorities. It is 
notable that one of the objectives of the Alberta Council on 
Aging is to foster co-ordination among the various seniors' 
groups in Alberta. 57 
Interactions Aimed at Co-ordination 
in Aging Policy 
Description and analysis of interactions 
Internal interactions (within the focal departments--
the major departmental actors) 
Intradepartmental interactions generally occur in each 
of the major departmental actors but, for the most part, they 
are not aimed at co-ordinating aging policy. Special units on 
aging either serve in an advisory capacity on aging matters 
(i.e., Alberta's Senior Citizens Bureau and Manitoba's Aged 
Services) or have program responsibilities vis-a-vis the elderly 
(i.e., Ontario's Adult Services Division, Newfoundland's Division 
of Services to Senior Citizens, Prince Edward Island's Division 
of Services to the Aging and Saskatchewan's Senior Citizens 
Branch). In neither case do they exist to facilitate interactions 
for co-ordination. Provincial gerontologists act as resource 
persons on aging matters for their horne departments. Generally, 
their advisory role does not include facilitating interaction 
among departmental officials for the purpose of co-ordination. 
The only exception to this observation is the role of 
Saskatchewan's Provincial Gerontologist. In addition to his 
advisory function, he acts as a co-ordinator "in areas of 
gerontology,,,58 which means he facilitates intradepartmental 
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interactions for co-ordination in aging policy. Program 
Consultants on Senior Citizens Services in Ontario basically 
act as the Ministry of Community and Social Services' field 
representatives for programs vis-a-vis the elderly that fall 
under the Ministry's purview. (These programs are often 
implemented by regional government departments.) Program 
Consultants do not interact with other officials in their 
Ministry for the purpose of co-ordinating policy in the field 
of aging. 
Only two provinces indicated that interactions for 
co-ordination occur between deputy ministers and selected senior 
officials in the focal departments (i.e., Nova Scotia), or 
among departmental officials at the field office level (i.e., 
New Brunswick) . 
One province, Prince Edward Island, noted that little 
intradepartmental interaction occurs and that interactions 
among three divisions with program responsibilities vis-a-vis 
the elderly (i.e., Aging Services, Special Services, and Field 
Services) need to be improved. Furthermore, any existing 
interactions are not aimed at co-ordination. 
On the basis of the preceding description of intra-
departmental interactions, what can be said about formalisation 
and intensity? Generally, these interactions are neither 
formalised nor intense. Most of them are not for the purpose 
of co-ordination. No co-ordinating mechanism (e.g., an intra-
departmental co-ordinating committee on aging) exists to 
facilitate intradepartmental interactions in any of the provinces. 
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Few, if any, resources appear to be invested in intradepartmental 
interactions for co-ordination. Frequency of interaction is not 
apparent. 
In view of the above, analysis of intradepartmental 
interactions with respect to the formes) of power available to 
the actors involved is of limited value. Intradepartmental 
interactions, in general, can involve the exercise of both 
control and influence. The form of power used depends on the 
actors' positions in the department's hierarchy (i.e.,.possession 
of legal-rational authority). Ministers of departments can 
exercise control as well as influence in intradepartmental 
interactions. Special units and offices on aging that serve in 
an advisory capacity are only able to use influence in their 
relations with other officials in their departments. Units 
with program responsibilities in the field of aging can use 
influence alone in their interactions with other departmental 
divisions; however, within the units, hierarchical superiors 
(i.e., directors of the units) are able to exercise both 
control and influence over their subordinates. 
External interactions within government (between the focal 
departments and other government departments and institutions 
at the same level of government) 
Interdepartmental interactions vary from province to 
province. In some provinces, these interactions are facilitated 
by interdepartmental committees that: (1) deal exclusively with 
aging policy; (2) focus on one facet (e.g., housing the elderly) 
of aging policy; or, (3) consider aging matters with a broader 
policy context. In other provinces, interdepartmental 
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interactions occur on a less formal basis. Regardless of 
whether these interactions take place through the forum of an 
interdepartmental committee or on a less formal basis, in most 
provinces they are not specifically aimed at co-ordination. 
Alberta and Saskatchewan have interdepartmental committees 
that deal exclusively with aging policy. Alberta's Interdepartmental 
Co-ordinating Committee on Senior Citizens is a nonelected, official-
level committee comprised of representatives from ten 
departments all of which have program responsibilities or a 
special interest in the field of aging. Despite its title, the 
Committee does not have any authority or responsibility for co-
ordination. Committee members meet on a voluntary basis to 
exchange information. They do not interact for the purpose of 
co-ordination. Saskatchewan has two interdepartmental committees 
on aging. They are: an informal Interdepartmental Group on 
Gerontology, and, an Interdepartmental Committee on Senior 
Citizens. Both Committees are comprised of officials from 
departments involved in aging policy. (Approximately fourteen 
departments have program responsibilities in the field of aging.) 
The Interdepartmental Group on Gerontology meets to "exchange 
information about departmental activities affecting seniors, as 
well as general issues facing the elderly."S9 Hence, interactions 
facilitated by this Committee are not specifically aimed at 
co-ordination. The Interdepartmental Committee on Senior 
Citizens does, however, provide a forum for interaction for 
co-ordination. It meets on a regular basis to share information 
and co-ordinate services. 
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Ontario has an interdepartmental committee that focuses 
on one facet of aging policy. It is called the Triministerial 
Committee on Housing for the Elderly. The Committee is comprised 
of officials from three ministries (i.e., Health, Housing, and 
Community and Social Services). All of these ministries have 
programs that provide some form of housing for the aged (i.e., 
nursing homes, senior citizens' apartments and homes for the 
aged). The Committee facilitates interaction for the purpose 
of co-ordinating housing programs for the elderly. 
Three provinces have interdepartmental committees which 
consider aging matters within a more general orientation. 
Newfoundland's Interdepartmental Liaison Committee is comprised 
of officials from the Departments of Health and Social Services. 
Among other things, mutual concerns in the field of aging are 
considered. It is not clear if Committee meetings involve 
interactions for co-ordination. In addition to interdepartmental 
committees on aging, Alberta and Saskatchewan have more generally 
oriented committees. Alberta's Joint Planning Interdepartmental 
Committee is composed of deputy ministers from the Department of 
Social Services and Community Health and the Department of 
Hospitals and Medical Care. It deals with all matters of joint 
concern, but this does not include interactions for co-ordination 
in aging policy. Saskatchewan's Health and Social Services 
Co-ordinating Committee includes representation from the 
Departments of Health and Social Services. The Committee meets 
regularly "mainly to resolve issues of common concern and to 
deal with administrative problems . It does not, however, 
"ordinarily undertake joint planning and co-ordination of 
services for the elderly.,,61 
Both New Brunswick and Newfoundland are presently 
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considering the creation of an interdepartmental committee on 
aging. New Brunswick had an Interdepartmental Committee on 
Care for the Aging, but its only purpose was to produce a 
report on past, current and recommended programs for the elderly. 
One of its recommendations was the creation of a permanent 
interdepartmental committee on aging to deal with the increasing 
quantity and complexity of aging issues and the need for 
d ' . 62 co-or lnatlon. 
Interdepartmental interactions in every province occur 
on a less formal basis. Special units and offices on aging 
that serve in an advisory capacity in their home departments 
also perform the same function for other departments involved 
in the field of aging. Consequently, they regularly interact 
with officials from other departments. These interactions, 
however, are not aimed at co-ordination. They are for the 
purpose of exchanging or seeking information on aging concerns. 
Saskatchewan's Provincial Gerontologist does interact with 
officials from other departments for the purpose of co-ordination, 
but this is an exception. One of the objectives of Alberta's 
Senior Citizens Bureau is to encourage co-ordination among 
departments on matters affecting the elderly; nonetheless, 
encouraging co-ordination is not the same as interacting for the 
purpose of co-ordination. In some cases, interactions occur 
between and among the field office personnel of different 
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departments. For example, in Manitoba there tend to be natural 
alliances between Regional Program Community Workers (Aged 
Services, Department of Health) and Regional Recreation 
Specialists (Fitness and Recreation Branch, Department of 
Fitness, Recreation and Sport). In Ontario, there is some 
interaction among the field office personnel from four ministries 
(i.e., Community and Social Services, Health, Housing and 
Culture and Recreation). Interactions of this sort, however, 
are not specifically for co-ordination. 
Despite a few exceptions, interdepartmental interactions 
in most provinces are neither formalised nor intense. Regardless 
of whether official approval is given for these interactions or 
whether mechanisms (e.g., interdepartmental committees) exist 
to facilitate them, the interactions are not specifically aimed 
at co-ordination. The variable of formalisation is only 
applicable to interactions for co-ordination. Interdepartmental 
interactions, especially in some provinces (i.e., Alberta and 
Saskatchewan) are frequent and involve a sizable investment of 
resources'. Since most of these interactions are not for the 
purpose of co-ordination, they can not be described as intense. 
The measures of intensity pertain to interactions for co-ordination. 
It is notable that three years ago a report of the Ontario 
Council of Health (1978) to the Minister of Health recommended 
that the government of Ontario: 
. . • give significant attention, and consider 
as a matter of urgency, the development of a 
governmental organisation with responsibility 
for coordination on an inter-ministerial basis. 
The recommendation that the government create 
a special agency, detached from direct 
responsibility to anyone Ministry, but 
charged with the responsibility of 
coordinating the services to the elderly 
across several Ministries, is a matter 63 
of high priority and great significance. 
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Influence ,is the only form of power available to actors 
in any interdepartmental interactions. No one department or 
official from a department possesses legal-rational authority 
over other departments and their officials. Control, therefore, 
cannot be used in interdepartmental interactions. Some 
departments might, however, be more influential than others by 
virtue of their expertise and program responsibilities in the 
field of aging (e.g., departments of health and social services). 
Executive-bureaucratic interactions (i.e., interactions 
between the focal departments and the executive of government in 
each province), unlike intradepartmental and interdepartmental 
interactions, are aimed at co-ordination in the field of aging. 
As noted previously in this chapter, executive-bureaucratic 
interactions usually occur within a broader policy context (e.g., 
social services, community services and/or health services) and 
involve mainly policy planning and resource management. Officials 
from several provinces indicated that most, if not all, interactions 
for co-ordination in aging policy take place in the executive-
bureaucratic category of interaction. 
The most obvious illustration of the importance of 
executive-bureaucratic interactions for co-ordinating aging 
policy is provided by Nova Scotia's Senior Citizens Secretariat. 
Its title is really a misnomer because the Secretariat is a 
bona fide committee of cabinet. The Senior Citizens Secretariat 
is a recent creation (April 1, 1980). Its membership includes 
four ministers (i.e., the Minister of Municipal Affairs, the 
Minister of Health, the Minister in charge of the Housing 
Commission and the Minister of Social Services) and a small 
staff. All of the ministers are heads of departments with 
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program responsibilities in the field of aging. Generally, the 
role of the Secretariat is to provide leadership in aging policy 
by working with departments involved in this policy field to 
develop priorities and bring in new programs. Each department, 
however, is responsible for the final development of programs 
for the aged that fall under its purview. More specifically, a 
key function of the Senior Citizens Secretariat is "to co-ordinate 
and facilitate the development of departmental programs.,,64 The 
Secretariat plays a major role in providing a forum for interaction 
aimed specifically at co-ordinating aging policy across departmental 
boundaries. 
The existence and role of the Senior Citizens Secretariat 
is unique. Neither the federal government nor any other provincial 
governments have such a central, government-wide co-ordinating 
mechanism devoted to aging policy alone (i.e., no other government 
has a cabinet committee on aging). Perhaps the existence of a 
cabinet committee on aging in Nova Scotia explains the absence 
of an interdepartmental committee on aging and the apparent lack 
of formalisation and intensity in interdepartmental interactions 
noted earlier in this chapter. At least in Nova Scotia, the 
latter might not be necessary in view of the former. 
In all other provinces, executive-bureaucratic 
interactions are less exclusive (i.e., focus on a broader policy 
field) and involve the focal departments and various subunits of 
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the executive of government. These subunits are generally the 
same in each province and include: the cabinet or executive 
committee, a planning/priorities cabinet committee, a treasury 
or management board, a social policy committee, and cabinet 
secretariats. In addition, two provinces have policy ministries 
(i.e., the Ministries for Social Development in Ontario and 
Quebec) which function much like the federal Ministry of State 
for Social Development. They interact with social policy 
departments for the purpose of co-ordinating social policy 
initiatives. 
Unfortunately, little more can be said about executive .... 
bureaucratic interactions aimed at co-ordination in aging policy. 
Only one province, Nova Scotia, provided explicit details on 
the nature of these interactions. Other provinces merely 
indicated that most interaction for co-ordination in aging policy 
occurs in the executive-bureaucratic category of interaction 
and provided the names of the actors involved. Furthermore, the 
paucity of published literature on the executive of provincial 
governments precluded any general description of executive-
bureaucratic interactions. 
There is, however, sufficient evidence to indicate that 
executive-bureaucratic interactions at the provincial level are 
basically similar to those at the federal level of government. 
Both levels of government possess the same basic mechanisms 
(i.e., the cabinet, cabinet committees, and cabinet secretariats) 
to facilitate executive-bureaucratic interactions for the purpose 
of co-ordination. For example, provincial cabinets, like the 
federal cabinet, provide a forum for interaction between and 
among ministers whose departments have program responsibilities 
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vis-a-vis the elderly. Many of these interactions are for 
co-ordination. All provinces have a treasury or management 
board and many have priorities/planning and social policy 
committees. These provincial cabinet committees function much 
like federal cabinet committees. For example, in Alberta, 
interaction for co-ordination in aging policy mainly occurs in 
meetings of the Social Planning and the Priorities Committees of 
cabinet. 
In respect of the preceding description of executive-
bureaucratic interactions, they appear to be formalised. These 
interactions are not only officially sanctioned, but every province 
has several mechanisms (i.e., the cabinet, cabinet committees 
and cabinet secretariats) which facilitate interaction between 
the focal departments and the executive of government for the 
purpose of co-ordination. In most provinces, these co-ordinating 
mechanisms deal with aging policy within the context of a broader 
policy area. Only Nova Scotia has a co-ordinating mechanism 
that focuses exclusively on aging policy (i.e., the Senior Citizens 
Secretariat) • 
Executive-bureaucratic interactions are also intense. 
The existence of several co-ordinating mechanisms indicates a 
sizable investment of resources (e.g., time, personnel, money) . 
In addition, co-ordinating mechanisms provide for frequency of 
interaction. For example, cabinet and cabinet committees meet 
on a regular basis. 
Generally, influence is the only form of power available 
to the various actors in executive-bureaucratic interactions. 
74 
Most of these interactions, regardless of the forum which 
facilitates them, occur among ministers representing their 
departments. Since no minister possesses legal-rational authority 
over other ministers, control cannot be exercised in their 
interactions with each other. Some ministers are, however, 
likely to be more influential than others. Interactions between 
cabinet secretariats and departments also involve the use of 
influence. Cabinet secretariats perform a staff function for the 
cabinet and cabinet committees. They do not possess legal-
rational authority over line departments. Since there is no 
hierarchical relationship between cabinet secretariats and 
departments, control cannot be exercised in their interactions. 
Legislative-bureaucratic and judicial-bureaucratic 
interactions are not for co-ordination in aging policy. In the 
first place, neither provincial legislatures nor provincial courts 
are key actors in the field of aging. Secondly, any interactions 
between either the legislatures or the courts and the focal 
departments are not for the purpose of co-ordination. For example, 
opposition members of provincial legislatures interact with 
ministers of health and social services during oral question 
periods, but this interaction is aimed at controlling or 
influencing departmental activities. Even where a legislative 
committee on aging exists (i.e., Alberta's Committee on Senior 
Citizens), it engages in no interactions with the focal departments 
for the purpose of co-ordination. Judicial-bureaucratic interactions 
are aimed at exercising judicial controls over the bureaucracy. 
Since legislative-bureaucratic and judicial-bureaucratic 
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interactions are not for co-ordination in aging policy, they 
are neither formalised nor intense. Formalisation and intensity 
are only applicable to interactions directed at co-ordination. 
Generally, provincial legislatures and courts exercise 
control over departments. On the other hand, departments can 
only use influence in legislative-bureaucratic and judicial-
bureaucratic interactions. (See corresponding section in 
Chapter III for further details.) 
External interactions outside government (between focal 
departments and government departments and institutions at 
other levels of government as well as intergovernmental 
bodies/between focal departments and nongovernmental 
organisations at the provincial level) 
Intergovernmental interactions are described and analysed 
in Chapter VI of this thesis. 
Governmental-nongovernmental interactions occur between 
the focal departments and the main nongovernmental organisations 
active in the field of aging in each province. Generally, 
provincial governmental-nongovernmental interactions are similar 
to federal governmental-nongovernmental interactions. 
Nongovernmental organisations at the provincial level interact 
with focal departments for the purpose of providing information 
and research on aging concerns as well as eliciting information 
on government programs for the elderly. In the process, they 
often work closely with departmental officials in developing 
policy proposals and/or helping to provide some services (e.g., 
community-based services) to the elderly. Officials from the 
focal departments also contact nongovernmental organisations to 
get data on aging issues; test reaction on policy proposals; and, 
engender support for programs. Governmental-nongovernmental 
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interactions facilitate the development of new programs for the 
aged and provide a valuable source of feedback for the focal 
departments. These interactions are, however, not specifically 
aimed at co-ordination. 
Usually governmental-nongovernmental interactions take 
place between nongovernmental organisations and special units 
and offices on aging. One of the main functions of units and 
offices on aging is to provide a focal point within the major 
departmental actors and provincial governments as a whole for 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions. 
Alberta's Senior Citizens Bureau provides information 
and consultation to nongovernmental organisations active in the 
field of aging. For example, it works closely with the Provincial 
Senior Citizens Advisory Council and the Alberta Council on Aging. 
The closeness of this working relationship is evidenced by the 
following: 
- the Senior Citizens Bureau provides staff 
service to the Provincial Senior Citizens 
Advisory Council 
- the Senior Citizens Bureau co-sponsors 
workshops and studies with the Alberta 
Council on Aging and provides an information 
section for the Council's newsletter 
- both the Provincial Senior Citizens Advisory 
Council and the Alberta Council on Aging are 
funded by the Senior Citizens Bureau 
Interactions between the Senior Citizens Bureau and both the 
Provincial Senior Citizens Advisory Council and the Alberta 
Council on Aging are, for the most part, aimed at improving 
programs and program planning for the elderly. 
Manitoba's Aged Services provides information, referral 
and counselling services to seniors' organisations. It averages 
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seventy-eight service interactions with seniors' organisations 
(e.g., Manitoba Society of Seniors, Age and opportunity Centre) 
h 65 f h' . 1 " per mont. Most 0 t ese lnteractlons re ate to organlsatlon 
and program development. For example, Aged Services plans and 
executes events for seniors in conjunction with the Age and 
Opportunity Centre. Since Manitoba's Council on Aging (i.e., an 
advisory council) was recently established (March, 1980), its 
relationship with Aged Services is not yet known. 
Newfoundland's Division of Services to Senior Citizens, 
which was recently created (January, 1980), plans to use 
nongovernmental organisations in providing community-based 
programs for the aged. Right now, community-based programs 
are just in the developmental stage and the Division is consulting 
with senior citizens' organisations (e.g., The Newfoundland and 
Labrador Association for the Aging) on how best to provide 
services for the aged living in the community. 
Prince Edward Island's Division of Services to the Aged 
is also in the process of developing community-based programs for 
the elderly. Presently, its interactions with nongovernmental 
organisations are directed at promoting and developing appropriate 
programs for the aged in the community. In addition, there is a 
desire to make greater use of nongovernmental organisations in 
the future for the provision of community-based programs. 
Provincial Gerontologists in Saskatchewan and Ontario 
frequently interact with nongovernmental organisations in their 
respective provinces. For example, Saskatchewan's Provincial 
Gerontologist attends meetings of the Saskatchewan Gerontology 
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Association and was the Association's first president. He is 
also a permanent nonvoting member of the Senior Citizens 
Provincial Council. Ontario's Consultant on Gerontology acts 
as a resource person on aging matters for nongovernmental 
organisations active in the field of aging. He estimated that 
eighty per cent of his time is spent outside his horne department 
(i.e., the Ministry of Community and Social Services) for this 
purpose. 66 Interactions between Provincial Gerontologists and 
nongovernmental organisations are, however, not aimed at 
co-ordination. They involve primarily the dissemination or 
exchange of information. 
In addition to interactions between special units and 
offices on aging and nongovernmental organisations, governmental-
nongovernmental interactions occur between provincial advisory 
councils and focal departments. Generally, each advisory council 
reports to either a Minister of Health or a Minister of Social 
Services. The following is a list of provincial advisory 
councils and the ministers to whom they report. 
Advisory Council 
- Alberta's Senior Citizens 
Advisory Council 
- Manitoba's Council 
on Aging 
- Nova Scotia's Senior 
Citizens Advisory 
Commission 
- Ontario's Advisory 
Council on Senior 
Citizens 
- Quebec's Council on 
Aging 
- Saskatchewan's Senior 
Citizens Provincial 
Council 
Minister 
Minister of Social Services 
and Community Health 
Minister of Health 
Minister of Social Services 
Provincial Secretary for 
Social Development 
Minister in charge of the 
Ministry of State for Social 
Development 
Minister of Social Services 
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Advisory councils submit reports to their respective ministers 
that include policy recommendations which deal with many 
aspects (e.g., housing, income assistance) of aging policy. 
In order to compile these reports, advisory councils also 
interact with officials from all departments with program 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the elderly. They are expected to 
draw on any appropriate departments to fulfill their mandates. 
None of these interactions are for co-ordination. Advisory 
councils might recommend the need for more or improved co-
ordination. 
Finally, governmental-nongovernmental interactions also 
occur on a less formal basis. Often officials from focal 
departments as well as other departments involved in aging policy 
are members of nongovernmental organisations (i.e., advisory 
councils on aging and gerontology associations). For example, 
Alberta's Senior Citizens Advisory Council has representation 
from five departments (i.e., Social Services and Community 
Health, Hospitals and Medical Care, Housing and Public Works, 
Recreation and Parks, and, Advanced Education and Manpower) . 
Departmental representatives are senior public servants who are 
appointed to the Council by their respective ministers. As 
noted previously, Saskatchewan's Provincial Gerontologist is a 
member of the Senior Citizens Provincial Council. Departmental 
representation on nongovernmental organisations provides an 
opportunity for interaction on a less formal basis. Even these 
interactions, however, are not aimed at co-ordination in aging 
policy. 
Despite the apparent proliferation of governmental-
nongovernmental interactions, the preceding description of 
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these interactions makes it obvious that they are not specifically 
directed at co-ordination. Interactions involving information 
exchange are not the same as interactions aimed at co-ordination. 
The latter does involve the former, but the former does not 
necessarily involve the latter. Given the importance of 
nongovernmental organisations in the field of aging and the 
trend in some provinces to use these organisations for the 
provision of community-based programs, some analysis of existing 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions is desirable. 
While existing governmental-nongovernmental interactions 
are not for the purpose of co-ordination, they are officially 
approved. The most obvious example of this official approval is 
the relationship between advisory councils on aging and ministers 
of focal departments. Another example, is provided by the 
relations between special units and offices on aging and 
nongovernmental organisations. These units and offices on 
aging also act as mechanisms to facilitate governmental-
nongovernmental interactions. They provide a focal point within 
the major departmental actors and for provincial governments 
as a whole for these interactions. 
Existing governmental-nongovernmental interactions are 
frequent. They occur in a number of ways on a fairly regular 
basis. These interactions range from the submission of annual 
reports to ministers to a close working relationship with special 
units on aging. Departmental representation on nongovernmental 
organisations also provides an opportunity for frequent interaction. 
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The predominant form of power available to actors in 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions is influence. The 
actors involved do not have a hierarchical relationship; so 
control based on the possession of legal-rational authority 
cannot be used in these interactions. As noted previously in 
this thesis, one can interpret control in a broader sense and 
argue that the focal departments can exercise control over 
1 .. 67 nongovernmenta organlsatlons. Even if this argument is 
accepted, nongovernmental organisations are not without their 
own potent power resources. They possess information and 
expertise on aging matters. Nongovernmental organisations 
represent or provide services to a rapidly growing clientele 
(i.e., the elderly). Consequently, they have a great potential 
for exercising influence in governmental interactions. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described and analysed interactions 
directed at co-ordinating aging policy at the provincial level 
of government. 
The provincial government's role in aging policy and the 
major actors involved were outlined in the first part of the 
chapter. It was noted that the provincial government has a 
very extensive role in the field of aging based on its 
constitutional jurisdiction over many facets (e.g., health and 
social services, housing, transportation) of this policy field. 
Some actors (i.e., departments of health and social services, 
the executive of government and certain nongovernmental 
organisations) were found to be more active in aging policy 
than others (i.e., other provincial departments, 
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the provincial legislature, provincial courts and nongovernmental 
organisations which have an interest in the elderly as part of 
another clientele). 
The main part of the chapter focused on interactions for 
the purpose of co-ordination in aging policy. Provincial 
departments of social services and health, given their central 
role in the field of aging, were used as the focal departments 
for examining several categories of interaction. There are a 
number of general conclusions that can be made from the description 
and analysis of these interactions. 
Most categories of interaction are neither formalised 
nor intense. Intradepartmental, interdepartmental, legislative-
bureaucratic, judicial-bureaucratic and governmental-nongovernmental 
interactions are not directed at co-ordination. Consequently, 
none of these interactions can be viewed as formalised or intense. 
Formalisation and intensity only apply to interactions specifically 
aimed at co-ordination. 
Executive-bureaucratic interactions, however, are both 
formalised and intense. These interactions are directed at 
co-ordination. Not only are they officially sanctioned, but 
several co-ordinating mechanisms (i.e., the cabinet, cabinet 
committees and cabinet secretariats) exist to facilitate them. 
The existence of co-ordinating mechanisms also indicates a 
sizable investment of resources and provides for frequency of 
interaction (e.g., cabinet committees meet on a regular basis). 
It should be noted that interactions other than executive-
bureaucratic ones are officially approved; in some cases 
facilitated by certain mechanisms (e.g., committees, special units 
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and offices on aging) which require an investment of resources; 
and, sometimes frequent. For example, governmental-nongovernmental 
interactions are officially sanctioned. In some provinces, 
interdepartmental interactions are facilitated by interdepartmental 
committees on aging or more generally oriented committees. 
Governmental-nongovernmental interactions in all provinces and 
interdepartmental interactions in some provinces are frequent. 
Nevertheless, interactions other than executive-bureaucratic ones 
are not aimed at co-ordination in aging policy. 
The form of power available to the actors involved in 
the major categories of interaction varies. Generally, intra-
organisational (i. e., intradepartmental) interactions are 
characterised by the use of both control and influence, while 
interorganisational (i.e., interdepartmental, executive-
bureaucratic and governmental-nongovernmental) interactions are 
characterised by the use of influence. 
A few other conclusions are notable. First, executive-
bureaucratic interactions are the most important category of 
interaction for co-ordinating aging policy. No other category 
of interaction exhibits any formalisation or intensity. 
Secondly, most executive-bureaucratic interactions directed 
at co-ordination occur within the context of a broader policy 
field. Nova Scotia is the only province that has a cabinet 
committee on aging (i.e., the Senior Citizens Secretariat). 
Thirdly, executive-bureaucratic interactions aimed at 
co-ordination are mainly concerned with policy development and 
resource allocation. No information was provided on interactions 
for co-ordinating the implementation of aging policy. One 
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government official did, however, indicate that there is little 
or no formalisation in interactions for the purpose of co-
ordinating the implementation of programs for the elderly.68 
The implications of these conclusions are drawn out in the final 
chapter of the thesis. 
CHAPTER V 
Interactions for the Purpose of Co-ordination 
in the Field of Aging at the Municipal 
Level of Government 
A Qualification 
The third level of government that has a role in aging 
policy is the municipal government. Since a consideration of 
all municipal governments in Canada is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, only a case study of one local government is presented. 
The Regional Municipality of Niagara, a regional government in 
Ontario, and its area municipalities (five cities, five towns, 
and two townships) have been chosen for the case study. There 
are several reasons for this selection. They are: 
1. The Niagara Region was the first regional area in 
Ontario to undergo full-scale regional reorganisation--1979 
marked its tenth anniversary 
2. The Regional Municipality of Niagara has been the 
subject of at least one review commission, the Niagara Region 
Study Review Commission of 1977 or the Archer Commission, and 
several studies to assess its performance 
3. Niagara Regional government's Senior Citizens 
Department and its Director, who is also the current Chairman 
of Ontario's Advisory Council on Senior Citizens, have acquired 
national recognition as forerunners in the field of senior 
citizens' programs especially with respect to the development 
of a continuum of care for the elderly 
4. The population over 65 years of age in the Niagara 
Region is .6% higher than the provincial average. This 
difference is expected to increase to 1.1% by 1986. Approximately 
35-36% of Canada's elderly live in Ontario69 
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The Regional Municipality of Niagara's 
Role in Aging Policy 
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The role of Regional Niagara in the field of aging has 
to be understood within the context of provincial-municipal 
relations in general. Unlike federal and provincial governments, 
municipal governments are neither constitutionally ordained nor 
do they have constitutionally defined areas of jurisdiction. 
Section ninety-two of the British North America Act gives 
provincial governments responsibility for municipal governments 
(except in the Yukon and Northwest Territories). Provincial 
governments have 
. the unrestrained power to create, alter, 
and abolish municipalities, and to exercise whatever 
degree and methods of control over municipalities 
and over actions taken by municipalities that the 
provincial government cares to implement. 70 
Municipal governments are, therefore, the creations of provincial 
governments and have no legal right to their existence beyond 
the provincial legislation which created them. The provincial 
governments' control over municipalities extends beyond the 
ability of the former to create the latter. Whatever functions 
municipalities perform are delegated to them by their creators, 
the provincial governments. Most municipalities are created 
by general municipal acts (i.e., provincial legislation) that 
typically specify 
. . . the service functions that can or must be 
performed by municipalities, the structure of 
municipal decision making, terms of office of 
elected councillors, qualifications for voters 
and candidates, and the extent of municipal 
powers to raise revenue. 7l 
In addition, each province has a number of statutes and regulations 
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that affect provincial-municipal relations (e.g., police acts, 
education acts, health acts, planning acts, environmental 
pollution acts and assessment acts) .72 It is no wonder that 
provincial-municipal relations have been compared to IIfather-
h 'ld" II til 1 t' h' 73 c 1 or master-servan re a lons lpS. 
The superior-subordinate relationship of provincial 
governments and their municipalities can also be illustrated 
by the way the former exercise supervision and control over 
the latter. In most provinces, there are two kinds of provincial 
agencies that have supervisory and control responsibilities 
. , 1" 74 over munlclpa ltles. One is a provincial department of 
municipal affairs (in Ontario it is the Ministry of Intergovernmental 
Affairs) which is headed by a cabinet minister and is involved 
in the day-to-day supervision of municipalities (e.g., reviews 
municipal bylaws) .75 The other is a semiautonomous provincially 
appointed board (in Ontario it is the Ontario Municipal Board) . 
These boards are usually separated from or loosely connected to 
departments of municipal affairs. Their mandates are more 
narrowly defined than those of provincial departments of 
municipal affairs. Provincially appointed boards, like the 
Ontario Municipal Board, deal with individual municipalities 
on a sporadic and issue-by-issue basis. Typically, they function 
as courts of appeal against decisions made by municipalities 
(e.g., municipal zoning bylaw changes). 
Provincial governments also exercise supervision over 
, , l' t' . f' '1 76 munlclpa 1 les ln a lnancla way. Municipal governments are 
limited in their ability to raise revenue. They are restricted 
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to only those sources explicitly granted to them by provincial 
governments. There are three basic municipal revenue sources 
(i.e., property taxes, permits and licenses, and, fines and 
other penalties). Generally, they are not sufficient to cover 
municipal expenditures. In fact, local governments have become 
increasingly dependent on grants from senior governments. Most 
of these grants come from provincial governments and they have 
strings (i.e., conditions) attached. Provincial conditional 
grants specify the uses of the money (i.e., the purpose of the 
grant) and municipal contributions (i.e., anywhere from 50 to 
30 per cent of the shared cost arrangement). In this way, 
provincial governments are able to supervise their municipalities. 
Furthermore, the fiscal imbalance (i.e., municipal revenue 
sources as compared to their expenditures) has led to a trend 
in recent years for provincial governments to intervene in or 
assume 1 1 'b'l" 77 oca government responsl 1 ltles. 
The preceding general overview of provincial-municipal 
relations leads to the conclusion that municipalities are 
clearly subordinate to their creators, the provincial governments. 
Any functions performed by municipal governments, including 
whatever role they have in aging policy, are delegated to them 
by their respective provincial government. Unlike the division 
of powers between federal and provincial governments, which is 
outlined in the British North America Act, municipal government 
responsibilities can be changed, removed, or eroded by provincial 
governments. As David Siegel notes, " ... any delegation of 
power [to municipal governments by provincial governments] has 
been tentative and constrained by conditional grants and by the 
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need for approvals by cabinet, ministers or supervisory 
. ,,78 
agencles. 
Within the context of general provincial-municipal 
relations, what role does the Regional Municipality of Niagara 
have in aging policy? The regional government of Niagara is 
primarily involved in operating Homes for the Aged and 
developing a range of community-based programs for the elderly. 
Homes for the Aged are a type of living accommodation for the 
elderly that provides three levels of care--Residential Care 
(ambulatory), Special Care (confused), and Bed Care. Community-
based programs include: Postal Alert Security, Day Care Program, 
Horne Help Services Program, Senior Volunteers in Service Program, 
Talk-a-Bit Program, Meals-on-Wheels, Group Horne Help Program 
(i.e., Satellite Horne Care), and, Vacation Care Program. The 
government of Ontario subsidises the cost of some of these 
programs (i.e., Homes for the Aged and the Vacation Care Program). 
Other programs (i.e., Day Care Program, Horne Help Services 
Program and Meals-on-Wheels) are received for a nominal cost 
by the recipient. Still other programs either involve no costs 
(i.e., Senior Volunteers in Service Program, Talk-a-Bit Program 
and Group Horne Help Program) or are funded by nongovernmental 
charitable organisations (i.e., the United Way funds the Postal 
Security Alert Program). Financial assistance (e.g., Supplementary 
Aid for Seniors) is also administered by the Niagara Regional 
Government. The cost of providing such assistance is shared 
by all three levels of government (i.e., federal, provincial, 
and regional governments) . 
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The Regional Municipality of Niagara's area municipalities 
have a minor role in the field of aging. For example, the 
Department of Finance in St. Catharines administers a program 
of reduced bus fare for seniors (the city picks up the deficit) 
and property tax credits for seniors who own residential or 
farm property (funding provided by the provincial government). 
Recreation departments/commissions in area municipalities 
(i.e., Grimsby, Fort Erie, Niagara Falls, Port Colborne and 
St. Catharines) with senior citizen centres (i.e., social and 
recreational centres for seniors) provide some form of assistance 
(e.g., the provision of facilities, equipment and/or advice) to 
the centres. 
There are two additional types of programs available 
to the elderly at the regional level. Some health services 
(i.e., Home Care Program and Health Clinics for Seniors in 
senior citizens' complexes) are provided by the Niagara 
Regional Health Unit (i.e~, a special purpose body). There 
is also a Niagara District Health Council, which is one of 
twenty-one district health councils in Ontario that serve as 
advisory bodies to the Minister of Health, but it does not 
deliver any services to the aged. It functions as a local 
planning body for health care services in the Niagara Region. 79 
Nursing homes in Regional Niagara are owned and operated by 
individuals or corporate entrepreneurs, but they are licensed 
and supervised by the Ministry of Health. Senior citizen housing 
(i.e., self-contained low rental housing accommodation designed 
and constructed specifically for the aged under the provisions 
of the National Housing Act) is operated and managed by local 
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Housing Authorities (i.e., East Niagara Housing Authority and 
North Niagara Housing Authority) which fall under the southern 
Ontario Branch of the Ontario Housing Commission. Both the 
federal and provincial governments provide the deficit subsidy 
for senior citizens' low rental housing. 
The Actors 
Public organisations (i.e., regional departments) 
While the preceding description of Regional Niagara's 
role in the field of aging suggests a multitude of departmental 
actors, this is not really the case. Most of the programs fall 
under the purview of one department. It is appropriately 
called the Senior Citizens Department. The Director of the 
Department is D. H. Rapelje. Prior to 1976, the Senior Citizens 
Department was called the Homes for the Aged Department. The 
latter title basically reflected the Department's role in 
operating five Homes for the Aged in the Niagara Region. Prior 
to 1976, the Social Services Department, another regional 
government department, had a Senior Citizens Branch. Since then, 
aging concerns have been generally consolidated under the Senior 
Citizens Department which is in charge of admissions to and the 
operation of Homes for the Aged as well as the development of 
a continuum of care (i.e., community-based programs) for the 
elderly. The Social Services Department, however, still 
administers financial assistance (e.g., Supplementary Aid for 
Seniors) for the aged. 
It is clear from the above and from the very title of 
the Senior Citizens Department that it has major program 
92 
responsibilities in the field of aging at the regional level. 
Only two other regional government departments/agencies are 
involved in aging policy (i.e., the Social Services Department 
and the Niagara Regional Health Unit), but neither of them have 
major program responsibilities vis-a-vis the elderly. None of 
Regional Niagara's area municipalities have departments with 
key responsibilities in the field of aging. Consequently, the 
Senior Citizens Department is used as the focal department for 
the purp.ose of describing and analysing interactions for co-
ordination at the regional level. 
It is notable that neither of the senior levels of 
government have a department on aging. Much of the impetus of 
the Senior Citizens Department and the direction it has taken 
appear to be the result of both the insight and enthusiasm of 
its Director. 
Other actors in the field of aging 
Government institutions at the regional level 
Government institutions at the regional level can not 
be discussed under the headings (i.e., the executive, the 
legislature, and the courts) used in the previous two chapters. 
These headings are not strictly applicable to regional government. 
For one thing, there is no cabinet. Regional Council is more 
like a legislature. In addition, there are no regional courts 
administered by regional government. It makes more sense, 
therefore, to describe government institutions active in the 
field of aging at the regional level under the general heading 
of governmental actors. 
Governmental actors in the field of aging include: 
1. The Chairman of Regional Council who is 
elected by the Council 
2. Regional Council which is comprised of twelve 
mayors and seventeen directly elected regional councillors. 
3. Two standing committees of Council (i.e., the 
Finance Committee and the Social Services Committee) 
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4. An Executive Assistant to Regional Council and its 
Chairman 
With the exception of the Social Services Committee, the actors 
listed above are directly or indirectly involved in all areas 
of regional responsibility (i.e., debenture financing, regional 
water supply and purification, regional sewage disposal, police 
protection, health and welfare services, and conservation). 
Aging policy, itself, is considered within the larger context 
of health and welfare services. 
Generally, the role of Regional Council (i.e., the twenty-
nine councillors and the Chairman) is to make policy decisions 
in the areas of responsibility delegated to regional government 
by the goverment of Ontario. In fact, most of Council's work 
is done by four standing committees (i.e., the Finance Committee, 
the Planning and Development Committee, the Public Works and 
Utilities Committee and the Social Services Committee). These 
standing committees of Council function much like federal or 
provincial cabinet committees. Each one is comprised of eight 
to twelve regional councillors and is empowered to enquire into 
and report to Council on all matters within its area of 
responsibility (e.g., the Finance Committee on financial matters, 
the Public Works and Utilities Committee on public works and 
utilities). In addition, each standing committee supervises one 
or more regional government departments. For example, the 
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department heads (i.e., Directors) of the Senior Citizens 
Department and the Social Services Department report to the 
Social Services Committee. 
Of all the governmental actors listed previously, the 
Social Services Committee is the most active in the field of 
aging. The Social Services Committee, under the umbrella of 
social services, is responsible for aging policy (i.e., those 
programs for the elderly delegated to regional government by the 
government of Ontario). More specifically, it is responsible 
for the operation of Homes for the Aged as well as the various 
community-based programs available to the elderly in the Niagara 
Region. The two regional government departments with program 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the aged (i.e., the Senior Citizens 
Department and the Social Services Department) report to the 
Social Services Committee which, in turn, makes recommendations 
for appropriate action to Regional Council. (There is no direct 
relationship between the Social Services Committee and the 
Niagara Regional Health Unit.) 
Government departments and institutions at other levels of 
government and intergovernmental bodies 
Government departments and institutions active in aging 
policy at federal and provincial levels of government are 
described separately in Chapters III and IV respectively. 
Intergovernmental bodies are discussed in Chapter VI. 
Nongovernmental organisations 
There are eighty-six senior citizens' organisations in 
. I' 80 Reglona Nlagara. These organisations can be subdivided into 
four main types: organisations associated with elderly persons' 
centres (or senior citizen centres); senior citizens' clubs; 
residents' councils; and, senior citizen advisory councils. 
Generally, these Seniors' organisations provide social and 
recreational programs for the aged or offer information on 
aging concerns. The four types are discussed briefly below. 
The vast majority of senior citizens' organisations 
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in the Niagara Region are senior citizens' clubs. These clubs 
(e.g., Beamsville Senior Citizens Club, Club D'Age D'Or de 
Niagara) represent a social gathering of seniors who meet on a 
weekly, biweekly, or monthly basis in church halls or community 
buildings. 
There are six elderly persons' centres in Regional 
Niagara (i.e., one in Fort Erie, Grimsby, Niagara Falls, Port 
Colborne, and two in St. Catharines). An elderly persons' 
centre is "a program and/or service centre for older adults." 81 
These centres are officially approved by Ontario's Ministry of 
Community and Social Services under the Elderly Persons' 
Centres Act. Their designation as elderly persons' centres 
makes them eligible for capital grants and operating subsidies 
from the Ministry of Community and Social Services. The actual 
programs, which are social or recreational in nature, provided 
by the centres are developed and executed by the seniors' 
organisations associated with the centres. For example, the 
Senior Citizens Association in St. Catharines operates the 
Dunlop Drive ~lderly Persons' Centre. 
There are eight residents' councils in the Niagara 
Region. Residents' councils are located in each of the five 
Homes for the Aged operated by the Senior Citizens Department 
and in three homes for the elderly run by charitable institutions. 
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Every council represents and speaks for the aged in the 
individual home. A residents' council "attempts to resolve 
problems and constructively contribute to the operation of the 
Home, as well as contribute personally in supporting the 
programs, aims and objectives of the individual Homes. ,,82 
There are two senior citizen advisory councils in 
Regional Niagara. They are: (1) the Fort Erie Senior Citizens 
Advisory Board; and, (2) the Senior Citizens Advisory Council 
of St. Catharines. These Councils serve "to advise those Senior 
Citizens in the community in need of guidance and information." 83 
The particular responsibilities of each Council vary according 
to the community it serves. Neither of the Councils, however, 
should be confused with federal or provincial advisory councils 
on aging. Unlike the latter, the former do not have an official 
relationship with government (i.e., regional government). 
Senior citizen advisory councils in the Niagara Region do not 
officially report to any member of Regional Councilor submit 
briefs to the Senior Citizens Department. 
One other nongovernmental organisation is active in the 
field of aging at the regional level. The Canadian Red Cross 
Scoiety offers a variety of services (e.g., family health clinics, 
homemaker services, sickroom equipment) to the elderly in the 
community. These services are, however, not confined to the 
aged but apply to anyone in need. 
Interactions Aimed at Co-ordination 
in Aging Policy 
Description and analysis of interactions 
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Internal interactions (within the Senior Citizens Department) 
Intradepartmental interactions for co-ordination in 
aging policy occur between and among key officials in the 
Senior Citizens Department. Generally, co-ordination of 
services is one of the responsibilities of each regional 
84 government department. More specifically, the Senior 
Citizens Department's delivery of programs for the elderly is 
co-ordinated through intradepartmental interactions facilitated 
by the way in which the Department is organised. All of the 
community-based programs fall under the supervision of a 
Community Services Support Co-ordinator. Each of the five 
Homes for the Aged is under the direction of an Administrator. 
Entry into either community-based programs or Homes for the 
Aged is handled by an Intake and Counselling Department (i.e., 
a division of the Senior Citizens Department) which provides 
an information and referral service for the elderly in Regional 
Niagara. These organisationa~ features of the Senior Citizens 
Department are connected by several hierarchical and advisory 
relationships. The Community Services Support Co-ordinator, 
the five Administrators of Homes for the Aged, and, the Intake 
and Counselling Department are all in a line position vis-a.-vis 
the Director of the Senior Citizens Department. They report 
directly to their department head. In addition, there are 
advisory relationships between: 
1. The Community Services Support Co-ordinator and the 
five Administrators of Homes for the Aged 
2. The Community Services Support Co-ordinator and 
the Intake and Counselling Department 
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3. The five Administrators of Homes for the Aged and 
the Intake and Counselling Department 
The hierarchical and advisory relationships described facilitate 
intradepartmental interactions for the purpose of co-ordination. 
The size of the Senior Citizens Department appears to 
have some effect on intradepartmental interactions. Relative 
to federal or provincial departments, the Senior Citizens 
Department is small. It has only three main divisions (i.e., 
community support services, general administration, and homes 
for the aged). Each division is directly under the Department's 
head. Two of the three divisions are responsible for the major 
programs (i.e., community-based programs and Homes for the Aged) 
provided to the elderly by the Regional Municipality of Niagara. 
The comparatively small size of the Senior Citizens Department 
fosters the development of person-to-person familiarity. In 
turn, person-to-person familiarity facilitates intradepartmental 
interactions. Familiarity does not ensure that interactions 
will occur; nor does it guarantee that interactions will be 
aimed at co-ordination. Familiarity does, however, create a 
climate conducive to intradepartmental interactions for 
co-ordination. 
Interactions within the Senior Citizens Department might 
also be affected by the fact that the whole Department is 
devoted to aging concerns. Since all departmental officials 
are involved in the same area of activity, there is a greater 
likelihood of intradepartmental interaction. There are fewer 
barriers to interaction than in departments whose officials 
are engaged in diverse activities. A greater likelihood of 
intradepartmental interaction also provides an atmosphere 
conducive to interactions aimed at co-ordination. 
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On the basis of the preceding description of interactions 
within the Senior Citizens Department, what can be said about 
formalisation and intensity? Intradepartmental interactions 
are both formalised and intense. First, co-ordination of 
services is one of the explicit responsibilities of each 
regional government department. Secondly, official approval 
for interactions directed at co-ordination within the Senior 
Citizens Department is indicated by the organisational features 
and the hierarchical and advisory relationships of the Department. 
Thirdly, although there is no co-ordinating mechanism to 
facilitate intradepartmental interactions (e.g., an 
intradepartmental committee on aging), the whole Department 
functions as a co-ordinating mechanism. The organisational 
features and relationships of the Department, as a whole, 
facilitate intradepartmental interactions. Fourthly, frequency 
of interaction is likely given the existence of hierarchical 
and advisory relationships. Finally, the creation of a 
department devoted solely to aging concerns and its role as a 
co-ordinating mechanism involve a sizable investment of resources. 
Both control and influence can be exercised in intra-
departmental interactions. The particular form of power used 
depends on the individual actors involved in these interactions. 
The Director of the Senior Citizens Department is able to 
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exercise both control and influence in his interactions with 
other departmental officials since he is the hierarchical head 
of the Department. The divisional heads of Community Support 
Services and Homes for the Aged can use control as well as 
influence within their respective divisions. Intradepartmental 
interactions between: (1) the Community Services Support 
Co-ordinator and Administrators of Homes for the Aged; (2) the 
Community Services Support Co-ordinator and the Intake and 
Counselling Department; and, (3) Administrators of Homes for 
the Aged and the Intake and Counselling Department involve the 
exercise of influence. The relationships of these actors are 
advisory in nature; so control cannot be used. 
External interactions within government (between the 
Senior Citizens Department and other government 
departments and institutions at the same level of 
government) 
Interdepartmental interactions occur between the Senior 
Citizens Department and other regional government departments. 
These interactions, however, are not directed at co-ordination 
in aging policy. They are more concerned with the overall 
administration of regional government departments. 
Interdepartmental interactions are basically facilitated 
by a Department Heads Committee. The Committee is chaired by 
the Regional Chairman and comprised of the heads (i.e., Directors) 
of the eight regional government departments. Committee meetings 
provide: 
• • • a forum in which the Department Heads 
of the Region can discuss issues of general 
interest, decide on appropriate action, and 
determine the administrative policies and 
procedures necessary to effectively carry 
out the administration of the Region on a 
uniform basis. 8S 
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Committee meetings also "give each Department Head the opportunity 
to advise other Department Heads of proposed departmental 
recommendations to committees [of Council] From this 
brief description of interdepartmental interactions facilitated 
by the Department Heads Committee, it is clear that these 
interactions are not for co-ordination in aging policy_ They 
either involve an attempt to co-ordinate the overall administration 
of regional government departments, or information exchange. In 
the first instance, co-ordination of the content of aging policy 
(i.e., the development and implementation of programs for the 
elderly), even within a larger policy context, is not really 
considered. In the second instance, information exchange is not 
the same as interactions specifically aimed at co-ordination. 
Despite the existence of a Department Heads Committee, 
interdepartmental interactions are neither formalised nor intense 
with respect to co-ordination of policy in the field of aging. 
While these interactions are officially approved and facilitated 
by a co-ordinating mechanism, they are not directed at co-
ordinating aging policy even within the context of a broader 
policy area. For this reason, they cannot be referred to as 
either formalised or intense. 
Interdepartmental interactions, in general, involve the 
use of influence. No one department head possesses legal-
rational authority over other department heads; so control 
cannot be exercised in interdepartmental interactions. The 
Regional Chairman, who chairs meetings of the Department Heads 
Committee, can use both control and influence in Committee 
meetings because he is a member of Regional Council. 
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Interactions between the Senior Citizens Department 
and other governmental actors (i.e., the Regional Chairman, 
Regional Council, the Social Services Committee and the 
Executive Assistant) are, for the most part, directed at co-
ordination in aging policy. Most of these interactions occur 
in meetings of the Social Services Committee. 
The Social Services Committee is responsible for the 
supervision of the Senior Citizens Department. The Committee, 
itself, is comprised of eight regional councillors and the 
Regional Chairman who is a voting member of each standing 
committee. The Director of the Senior Citizens Department 
reports to the Social Services Committee. Both the responsibility 
of the Social Services Committee and its membership ensure 
interaction between the Senior Citizens Department and other 
governmental actors. Moreover, this interaction is specifically 
aimed at co-brdination in the field of aging because the 
supervisory role of the Social Services Committee entails an 
interest in co-ordinating the development of programs for the 
elderly provided by the Senior Citizens Department. 87 
Consequently, the Social Services Committee acts as a co-
ordinating mechanism. It facilitates interaction between the 
Senior Citizens Department and other governmental actors for 
the purpose of co-ordination in aging policy. 
There is also some interaction between the Senior Citizens 
Department and the Executive Assistant. This interaction, 
however, is not specifically for co-ordination. The Executive 
Assistant is not a Chief Administrative Officer. He functions 
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in a purely advisory capacity and has no line control over 
departments. The Executive Assistant interacts with all 
department heads mainly for the purpose of consultation upon 
request. In addition, he serves as a liaison between the 
Regional Chairman and department heads. 
Interactions between the Senior Citizens Department and 
other governmental actors are formalised and intense. Official 
recognition is signified by the existence of a co-ordinating 
mechanism (i.e., the Social Services Committee). As noted 
previously, the Social Services Committee acts as a co-
ordinating mechanism because it facilitates interaction 
between the Senior Citizens Department and other governmental 
actors for the purpose of co-ordination. While the Committee 
is concerned with all social services provided by regional 
government, aging policy is a major focus for its activities. 
Intensity is indicated by: the frequency of interaction 
provided by meetings of the Social Services Committee (i.e., 
the Committee meets two or three times per month); and, the 
resources required for Committee meetings. 
Generally, both control and influence can be exercised 
in interactions between the Senior Citizens Department and other 
governmental actors. The Social Services Committee can use 
control and influence in its interactions with the Director 
of the Senior Citizens Department. The Committee's ability to 
exercise control is based on the fact that it possesses legal-
rational authority (i.e., direct line control) over the Senior 
Citizens Department. The Director of the Senior Citizens 
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Department, on the other hand, can only use influence vis-a-vis 
the Social Services Committee. He is hierarchically subordinate 
to the Committee; so he is not able to exercise control over it. 
The inability of the Director to use control in his interactions 
with the Social Services Committee does not affect his ability 
to exercise a great deal of influence in these interactions. 
The Director of the Senior Citizens Department is, indeed, a 
very influential man. Not only is he the head of the Department, 
but he is also the current Chairman of the Ontario Advisory 
Council on Senior Citizens. Furthermore, the Director of the 
Senior Citizens Department is held in high regard throughout 
Canada for his expertise and insight in the field of aging. 
Interactions between the Senior Citizens Department and the 
Executive Assistant involve the reciprocal use of influence. 
Neither of these actors possesses legal-rational authority over 
the other. 
External interactions outside government (between the Senior 
Citizens Department and government departments and institutions 
at other levels of government as well as intergovernmental bodies / 
between the Senior Citizens Department and nongovernmental 
organisations at the Regional level) 
Intergovernmental interactions are discussed in Chapter 
VI of this thesis. 
Governmental-nongovernmental interactions occur between 
the Senior Citizens Department and the various nongovernmental 
organisations active in the field of aging at the regional level. 
These interactions are, however, by no means uniform. For 
example, there is a close relationship between the Senior Citizens 
Department and residents' councils. Each Administrator of Homes 
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for the Aged has an advisory relationship with the residents' 
council located in his/her Home. The Director of the Department 
has his office in one of the Homes for the Aged (i.e., Sunset 
Haven). On the other hand, there is less contact between the 
Senior Citizens Department and seniors' clubs, centres, and 
advisory councils. The two advisory councils on aging have no 
official relationship with the Department. Elderly persons' 
centres are automonous and self-operating. On occasion, the 
Director of the Senior Citizens Department contacts seniors' 
organisations that run the centres for the purpose of planning 
a joint event between elderly persons' centres and Homes for 
the Aged. The Department is also in touch with the numerous 
seniors' clubs in the Niagara Region. In fact, it produces 
an information brochure cataloguing and describing every senior 
citizens' organisation in Regional Niagara. 
All of the governmental-nongovernmental interactions 
described above, however, are not directed at co-ordination. 
They generally involve information exchange and feedback. 
Consequently, these interactions are neither formalised or 
intense. Formalisation and intensity, as they are used in 
this thesis, only apply to interactions for co-ordination. It 
should be noted, nonetheless, that governmental-nongovernmental 
interactions at the regional level are officially approved and, 
at least in one case (i.e., between the Senior Citizens Department 
and residents' council~~ frequent. 
Influence is the form of power available to actors in 
any governmental-nongovernmental interactions. None of the 
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nongovernmental organisations described are linked to the Senior 
Citizens Department through a hierarchical (i.e., superior-
subordinate) relationship. Control, based on the possession of 
legal-rational authority, cannot be exercised in governmental-
nongovernmental interactions. If a broader interpretation of 
control is adopted, one can argue that the Senior Citizens 
Department can use control in its interactions with nongovernmental 
organisations based on its ability to develop and provide programs 
for the aged; and, supply information on aging concerns. 
(Nongovernmental organisations in Regional Niagara do not have 
an advocacy role in the field of aging; therefore, they do not 
submit policy recommendations to the Senior Citizens Department.) 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter described and analysed interactions directed 
at co-ordinating aging policy at the municipal level of government. 
In particular, it entailed a case study of the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara. 
The first part of the chapter outlined Regional Niagara's 
role in aging policy and the specific actors involved. Regional 
Niagara's role in the field of aging derives mainly from 
responsibilities delegated to it by the government of Ontario. 
These responsibilities include: the operation of Homes for the 
Aged; the development of community-based programs for the elderly; 
and, the administration of financial assistance to the aged. One 
regional government department, the Senior Citizens Department, 
has a major role in aging policy. Both Homes for the Aged and 
community-based programs fall under its purview. The Social 
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Services Department has a minor role in that it administers 
Supplementary Aid for Seniors. Two other kinds of actors are 
also active in the field of aging at the regional level. The 
Social Services Committee is the Committee of Regional Council 
responsible for aging policy. It supervises the Senior Citizens 
Department. Several nongovernmental organisations have a role 
in aging policy. Generally, they provide social and recreational 
activities for the elderly in the Niagara Region. 
The main part of the chapter focused on interactions 
for the purpose of co-ordination in aging policy. Several 
categories of interaction were examined. The Senior Citizens 
Department was used as the focal department and each category 
of interaction was viewed from its perspective. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the above. 
First, only two categories of interaction are formalised 
and intense. Both intradepartmental interactions and interactions 
between the Senior Citizens Department and other governmental 
actors (especially the Social Services Committee) exhibit the 
following characteristics: 
1. They are officially approved 
2. They are facilitated by a co-ordinating mechanism 
3. They are frequent 
4. They require a sizable investment of resources 
All of these characteristics are indicators of formalisation 
and intensity. 
Secondly, neither interdepartmental nor governmental-
nongovernmental interactions are formalised or intense. 
Interactions in both of these categories are not for co-ordination 
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in aging policy. The variables of formalisation and intensity, 
therefore, do not apply. 
The form of power available to actors engaged in 
interactions in the field of aging at the regional level varies. 
Generally, intraorganisational (i.e., intradepartmental) 
interactions involve the use of both control and influence, 
while interorganisational (i.e., interdepartmental and governmental-
nongovernmental) interactions involve the exercise of influence. 
The only exception to this generalisation is interaction between 
the Senior Citizens Department and other governmental actors 
(i.e., the Regional Chairman and Regional Council). The Social 
Services Committee can exercise control as well as influence in 
its relations with the Senior Citizens Department because it 
possesses legal-rational authority over the Department. The 
Department can only reciprocate with the use of influence. 
Interactions between the Executive Assistant and the Senior 
Citizens Department, however, involve influence alone. Neither 
of these actors possesses legal-rational authority over the 
other; so control cannot be exercised in their interactions. 
Several additional conclusions are noteworthy. Most 
interactions aimed at co-ordination occur within the Senior 
Citizens Department. Moreover, these interactions focus 
exclusively on aging policy. They are also concerned with both 
policy development and implementation. In fact, one can argue 
that the Senior Citizens Department functions like a co-ordinating 
mechanism par excellence. Housing major programs for the elderly 
in one department facilitates interactions among officials 
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engaged in the development and implementation of these programs. 
The close proximity of officials to one another and their 
involvement in the same area of activity makes interactions 
easier to conduct and more likely. The likelihood of 
interaction is further reinforced by the Department's organisation 
and its hierarchical and advisory relationships. Officials 
responsible for the programs administered by the Senior Citizens 
Department are linked to each other in either a hierarchical or 
an advisory way. Hierarchical and advisory relationships 
indicate official approval for interactions and provide for 
frequency of interaction. Finally, the establishment and 
continued operation of a department devoted solely to aging 
policy that functions as a co-ordinating mechanism requires a 
significant investment of resources. 
The existence of a department on aging whose various 
attributes make it a co-ordinating mechanism par excellance has 
two more implications. First, few, if any, interdepartmental 
interactions are necessary because responsibility for aging 
policy is not parcelled out among several departments. This 
can explain the absence of formalisation and intensity in 
interdepartmental interactions at the regional level. Secondly, 
a department on aging eliminates the need for other kinds of 
co-ordinating mechanisms. For example, an interdepartmental 
committee on aging is hardly necessary if all program 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the elderly are housed in one 
department. 
CHAPTER VI 
Interactions for the Purpose of Co-ordination 
in the Field of Aging Between and Among 
All Three Levels of Government 
Governments' Role in Aging Policy 
Each level of government's role in aging policy has 
been described in previous chapters. It is important to point 
out that while all three levels of government are active in the 
field of aging, the extent of their involvement varies. 
Provincial governments are the most active in the field 
of aging for two basic reasons. First, health and social 
services as well as many other facets of aging policy are under 
the constitutional jurisdiction of provincial governments. 
Secondly, provincial governments are the creators of municipal 
governments to whom they delegate specific service functions 
and, at least in the Niagara Region, some of these functions 
pertain to programs for the elderly. 
The federal government's involvement in the field of 
aging stems primarily from its jurisdiction in the area of 
income maintenance which evolved out of its post World War II 
commitment to the development of a national welfare state. 88 
Since income assistance is only one facet of aging policy, the 
federal government's role in this policy area is limited. 
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III 
The Regional Municipality of Niagara's activity in 
the field of aging arises from its responsibility for certain 
welfare services delegated to it by the government of Ontario. 
More specifically, Regional Niagara administers several programs 
for the elderly that are developed and supervised by the 
Ministry of Community and Social Services. (General policy 
guidelines for Homes for the Aged, community-based programs and 
financial assistance to the aged are developed by the Ministry 
of Community and Social Services which also supervises the 
implementation of these programs.) Regional Niagara's role 
in aging policy is, nonetheless, limited. The programs it 
administers only cover some facets of aging policy. Furthermore, 
responsibility for these programs can be changed, altered, or 
eroded by the government of Ontario. 
Because all three levels of government are involved in 
the field of aging, albeit in varying degrees, some interaction 
between and among them for the purpose of co-ordination seems 
appropriate. 
The Actors 
All of the various actors (i.e., public organisations, 
government institutions, and nongovernmental organisations) 
engaged in aging policy at each level of government have been 
described in previous chapters. Major actors for each level 
of government include: social services and health departments, 
the executive of government, and certain nongovernmental 
organisations that represent or provide services to the elderly. 
Focal departments, departments of social services and health, 
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are generally the same at each level of government. Only the 
Regional Municipality of Niagara has a Senior Citizens Department. 
Both the multiplicity and similarity of major actors at each 
level of government are obvious and point to the need for 
interaction between and among them for co-ordination in aging 
policy_ 
Intergovernmental Interactions Aimed at 
Co-ordination in Aging Policy 
Intergovernmental interactions refer to interactions 
between the focal departments and government departments and 
institutions at other levels of government as well as 
intergovernmental bodies. Rather than dealing with each of 
these interactions on a separate basis, they are described and 
analysed under the following subcategories of intergovernmental 
interactions: federal-provincial, interprovincial, provincial-
municipal, federal-municipal, and, federal-provincial-municipal. 
The general nature of these subcategories of interaction is 
outlined, then specific remarks are made with respect to aging 
policy_ Analysis of intergovernmental interactions is reserved 
for the latter part of the chapter. 
Federal-provincial interactions 
In general 
Generally, federal-provincial interactions occur in a 
number of ways. These interactions take place on a formal basis 
(i.e., federal-provincial committee meetings or conferences) and 
on a less formal basis (i.e., outside of committee meetings or 
conferences). They also occur at two levels: elected official 
level, and'nonelected official level. 
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The most obvious forum for federal-provincial interactions 
is the Federal-Provincial Plenary Conference or the First 
Ministers' Conference. The Conference is attended by the Prime 
Minister and the ten provincial Premiers. Meetin,:}s are held 
approximately twice a year. Over the years, conference agendas 
have covered a range of policy areas. Each meeting is, however, 
usually devoted to one policy area (e.g., energy, the constitution). 
Cabinet ministers whose departments are directly involved in the 
policy area discussed by First Ministers' Conferences often 
make representations at these meetings. Generally, these 
conferences are for the purpose of negotiating some form of 
agreement in overlapping or related areas of jurisdiction. 
Federal-provincial interactions also occur among federal 
and provincial cabinet ministers. A number of ministerial 
conferences and committees facilitate these interactions. 
Ministerial conferences and committees focus on a specific 
policy area (e.g., energy and resources, environment, finances) 
and the appropriate ministers (i.e., ministers whose policy 
area is discussed) attend them. Meetings are chaired by 
federal cabinet ministers. Generally, these meetings work out 
arrangements between the two levels of government which are then 
taken back to cabinets and legislatures for approval. Sometimes 
tentative arrangements are made on matters that are subsequently 
dealt with by First Ministers' Conferences. 
Beyond the ministerial level, federal-provincial 
interactions take place among bureaucrats from both senior 
levels of government. These interactions are facilitated by a 
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multitude of committees comprised entirely of nonelected 
officials from federal and provincial governments. Nonelected 
officials' committees vary according to their level of 
representation (i.e., deputy ministerial level, assistant 
deputy minister level, and, lower level officials) and the 
policy area (e.g., education, transportation, industry and 
trade) with which they are concerned. Deputy ministerial level 
committees generally provide secretariat services for First 
Ministers' Conferences and ministerial conferences. Committees 
composed of officials below the deputy ministerial level are 
either technical or operational in nature. Technical committees 
act as policy analysis and research groups, while operational 
committees tend to be directly involved in the implementation 
of joint federal-provincial programs. About ninety per cent of 
all formal federal-provincial meetings occur at the nonelected 
official committee level. 89 Technical and operational committees, 
in particular, account for more than two-thirds of all federal-
. . 1 . t 90 provlncla comml tees. 
Federal-provincial interactions are also facilitated by 
various structures at each level of government. These structures 
include: cabinet committees, central agencies, certain 
departments, and units within departments. Their existence is, 
however, not uniform throughout all federal and provincial 
governments. 
At the federal level of government, most of the 
forementioned structures exist, among other things, for the 
purpose of facilitating federal-provincial interactions. The 
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cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning is charged with 
the responsibility of formulating the federal government's 
strategy vis-a-vis the provincial governments and "overseeing 
federal-provincial relations.,,9l The Federal-Provincial 
Relations Office, a central agency, serves as an advisor to the 
cabinet on federal-provincial relations and other central 
agencies make "a significant contribution to the process from 
the perspective of their own policy responsibility.,,92 In 
addition, several federal departments (e.g., Finance, External 
Affairs) have a division on federal-provincial relations. 
At the provincial level of government, there are a 
variety of arrangements to facilitate federal-provincial 
relations, "but the trend is in the direction of separate 
departments or agencies of intergovernmental relations.,,93 
As early as 1961, the government of Quebec created a separate 
department for federal-provincial relations (i.e., the 
Department of Federal-Provincial Relations). In 1967, this 
department was reorganised and emerged as the Department of 
Intergovernmental Affairs. Almost a decade after Quebec's 
initiative, Ontario created a new kind of ministry, the Ministry 
of Treasury, Economic, and Intergovermental Affairs, whose 
function was "to co-ordinate economic and financial policy as 
well as intergovernmental relations (federal, provincial and 
municipal) .,,94 The Ministry has since been divided into two 
separate ones (i. e., the Ministry of Treasury and Economics 
and the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs). Four other 
provinces (i.e., Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, and, 
Saskatchewan) have also established separate departments/ 
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ministries for intergovernmental relations. 
In addition to the various federal-provincial committees 
and structures at each level of government that facilitate 
federal-provincial interactions on a formal basis, interactions 
occur on a less formal basis. For example, the federal Minister 
of Health and Welfare interacts with her counterparts in 
provincial governments outside of the context of committee 
. 95 
meet1.ngs. 
With respect to aging policy 
The preceding description of federal-provincial 
interactions focused on the general way in which the two senior 
levels of government interact. On the basis of this description, 
it is clear that there are many interactions between the two 
levels of government both among elected and nonelected officials 
in many policy areas. Does the same observation apply to 
federal-provincial interactions in the field of aging? 
For the most part, federal-provincial interactions have 
not focused on aging policy. Aging policy has never been the 
subject of a First Ministers' Conference. One facet of aging 
policy, a national pension plan, was the focus of several 
First Ministers' Conferences in the mid 1960's. There is a 
ministerial meeting of federal and provincial health and welfare 
ministers, but it has never addressed aging policy as a whole. 
Its most recent meeting (Spring of 1981) did discuss pension 
policy, but this is only one aspect of aging policy. There are 
nonelected official level committee meetings that deal with 
the general area of health and welfare. Aging policy, in its 
entirety, has not been a subject of their concern. None of 
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the various structures that exist either at the federal or 
provincial level of government for the purpose of facilitating 
federal-provincial interactions have focused on aging policy. 
Consequently, there are few, if any, federal-provincial 
interactions in the field of aging. Furthermore, these 
interactions are not directed at co-ordinating aging policy. 
While co-ordination might be a byproduct of federal-provincial 
negotiations and arrangements, this is not the same as interacting 
for the purpose of co-ordination. 
Do the various special units on aging facilitate 
federal-provincial interactions in the field of aging? The 
federal Department of Health and Welfare's newly created Office 
on Aging is expected to " • . • undertake an increasingly 
significant role in developing linkages . ,,96 with 
provincial departments involved in aging policy. Whether or not 
the Office on Aging lives up to this expectation remains to be 
seen. The special units on aging in seven provinces (i.e., 
Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, 
Quebec, and Saskatchewan) do not have a role in facilitating 
interactions between their home departments and the federal 
Department of Health and Welfare. This same observation applies 
to federal and provincial offices on aging (i.e., the federal 
Consultant on Aging, Provincial Gerontologists, and 
Ontario's Program Consultants on Senior Citizens Services). At 
present, neither special units nor offices on aging facilitate 
federal-provincial interactions, let alone interactions for co-
ordination in aging policy. 
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The paucity of federal-provincial interactions in the 
field of aging is further substantiated by the fact that officials 
from focal departments indicated that such interactions are rare. 97 
The only exception to this general observation is the interaction 
that occurs between the New Horizons' staff and provincial 
departments of social services. This interaction, however, is 
basically for the purpose of information dissemination. In 
particular, the New Horizons' staff lets provincial social 
services departments know which seniors' organisations in their 
provinc~s have applied for New Horizons'grants and which 
applications have been approved. 
Interprovincial interactions 
In general 
As is the case with federal-provincial interactions, 
interprovincial interactions occur in a number of ways. Many 
interprovincial interactions are conducted on a formal basis 
(i.e., interprovincial conferences or committee meetings), 
while some are less formal in nature (i.e., outside of committee 
meetings or conferences). These interactions also occur at two 
levels: elected official level, and nonelected official level. 
The Conference of Premiers is the provincial version 
of the Federal-Provincial Plenary Conference or the First 
Ministers' Conference. It is attended by all ten provincial 
Premiers and their top advisors. Meetings are held annually 
and the federal government sends observers to them. The 
Conference of Premiers is used to discuss common problems and 
mutual questions of interest. Meetinqs of provincial Premiers 
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have become "a forum for expressing shared policy concerns 
and provide opportunities for specific forms of interprovincial 
. ,,98 
cooperatlon. 
Interprovincial interactions are also facilitated by 
interprovincial ministerial meetings. These meetings focus on 
a certain policy area (e.g., welfare and social services) and 
are attended by provincial cabinet ministers involved in that 
policy area. For example, provincial social welfare ministers 
get together on a regular basis. The general purpose of all 
interprovincial ministerial meetings is information exchange. 
Beyond the ministerial level, there are nonelected 
official level committees. They are not as numerous or prolific 
as their federal-provincial counterparts. Generally, nonelected 
official level committees at the interprovincial level provide 
secretariat services for other interprovincial conferences and 
meetings. These secretariats are normally part-time and 
composed of seconded officials from the provincial government 
that chairs the meeting. 
Some provincial governments have special, separate 
departments that are responsible for interprovincial relations 
as well as federal-provincial relations (e.g., Ontario's 
Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Alberta's Department of 
Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec's Department of 
Intergovernmental Affairs and British Columbia's Ministry of 
Intergovernmental Relations have functions pertaining to 
interprovincial relations). 
Interprovincial interactions also occur on a less formal 
basis. Often they are the result of personal friendships and 
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contacts developed among officials from various provinces. 
For example, officials from provinces with special units or 
offices on aging t~nd to know each other and, therefore, interact 
on a personal basis. 
With respect to aging policy 
While there appear to be many interprovincial interactions, 
this observation does not apply to interactions in the field of 
aging. Aging policy has never been a focus for Premiers' 
Conferences. Nonelected official-level committees generally 
perform a staff function and do not concern themselves with the 
specifics of any policy area per see Special departments on 
intergovernmental relations, which include interprovincial 
relations, have not dealt with aging policy. None of the 
special units or offices on aging playa role in facilitating 
interprovincial interactions in the field of aging. Some 
officials from these units/offices on aging interact with 
similar officials from other provinces, but these interactions 
do not occur in an official capacity. They are frequently the 
result of personal friendships based on common membership in a 
nongovernmental organisation (e.g., the Canadian Association on 
Gerontology). Consequently, interprovincial interactions in 
the field of aging are uncommon. Furthermore, any interactions 
that do occur are not directed at co-ordinating aging policy 
but at exchanging information. 
On at least one occasion interprovincial interaction 
officially addressed aging policy. A National Symposium on 
Aging was held in 1978 as a result of concerns brought to 
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interprovincial ministerial meetings of social welfare 
ministers. 99 The necessity of co-ordination in aging polic¥ 
was a common theme at the Symposium. In fact, the Symposium 
ended with the suggestion that the interprovincial meetings of 
social welfare ministers set up some mechanism to facilitate 
interprovincial interactions in the field of aging. lOO The 
suggestion was, however, not acted upon. 
Provincial-municipal interactions (i.e., interactions between 
the Government of Ontario and the Regional Municipality of Niagara) 
In general 
Provincial-municipal interactions in Ontario occur in 
a number of ways. These interactions tend to be formal (i.e., 
provincial-municipal committee meetings) and thus reflect the 
overall nature of provincial-municipal relations described in 
Chapter V of this thesis. They also take place at two levels: 
elected official level, and nonelected official level. 
The Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs is involved 
in the day-to-day supervision of municipalities, and the 
Ontario Municipal Board deals with municipalities on a more 
d ' d' b' b' 101 h h " d spora lC an lssue- y-lssue aS1S. Bot t e Mlnlstry an 
the Board interact with local governments for the purpose of 
supervising and controlling the latters' activities. 
There is a Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee whose 
meetings occur eight to ten times a year, and bring together 
elected provincial and municipal officials in order "to discuss 
1 " d ff t' , , 1" ,,102 po lCles an programs a ec lng munlclpa ltles. 
Municipalities of Ontario are represented at committee meetings 
by the Municipal Liaison Committee, an umbrella organisation 
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spanning three municipal associations (i.e., Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario, Association of Counties and Regions 
of Ontario, and the Rural Ontario Municipal Association) and 
Metro Toronto. The provincial government is represented by the 
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and sometimes other 
ministers whose responsibilities have a bearing on municipalities. 
Provincial-Municipal Liaison Committee meetings "usually centre 
around proposed changes in legislation, the provincial budget, 
the municipal grant structure, and the general role and 
. b' 1" f 1 1 . h . ,,103 responsl 1 ltles 0 oca government ln t e provlnce .. 
Conferences of the three municipal associations mentioned 
above also provide an opportunity for provincial-municipal 
interactions. The associations are comprised of elected 
officials from local governments. Issues discussed at 
conferences form the main agenda for future discussions between 
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association executives and the provincial government. In 
addition, provincial ministers address these conferences. 
There are also frequent consultations between provincial 
and municipal authorities "during the drafting of a bill, in the 
form of parliamentary committees, special conferences, working 
. t ,,105 commlt ees, etc. 
Finally, provincial-municipal interaction is facilitated 
by conferences and meetings of associations of municipal civil 
servants (e.g., Municipal Engineers Association of Ontario). 
Provincial government officials "frequently attend the annual 
conferences or other meetings of these associations to explain 
provincial policies and obtain feedback.,,106 There is even an 
123 
Advisory Committee of the Municipal Engineers Association 
"which meets on a regular basis with the Minister of Transportation 
and Communications and his officials." l07 
With respect to aging policy 
The various forums for provincial-municipal interaction 
in Ontario do not facilitate interaction specifically for the 
purpose of co-ordination in the field of aging. Does this mean 
that there are no provincial-municipal interactions with respect 
to aging policy? No. 
There are provincial-municipal interactions that focus 
specifically on aging policy. These interactions generally 
occur between major actors in the field of aging from the 
provincial government and the Regional Municipality of Niagara. 
The most important interactions are described briefly below. 
The Ministry of Community and Social Services has a 
Program Consultant on Senior Citizens Services in the Niagara 
R . 108 eglon. He is one of approximately fifteen Program 
Consultants servicing eleven areas in the province. The 
Program Consultant on Senior Citizens Services does not administer 
any programs for the elderly. As noted in Chapter V, the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara, through its Senior Citizens Department, 
in particular, is responsible for the administration of Homes 
for the Aged and community-based programs. The Program 
Consultant basically acts as the Ministry of Community and 
Social Services' resource person on seniors' services in the 
area. He is als0 the fi~ld link in the Ministry's chain of 
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command through which supervision and control are exercised 
over the program responsibilities of the Senior Citizens 
Department. 
The Program Consultant on Senior Citizens Services 
interacts frequently with the Senior Citizens Department. After 
all, his clientele includes Administrators of Homes for the 
Aged and Supervisors of Home Support Programs (i.e., community-
based programs for the elderly). In addition, the Program 
Consultant interacts, albeit less frequently, with recreation 
departments/commissions in area municipalities that provide 
facilities and passive supervision for elderly persons' centres. 
These particular recreation departments/commissions are also 
part of his clienteae. 
The Social Services Committee (i.e., a committee of 
Regional Council) plays an important liaison role between the 
Senior Citizens Department and major provincial departments 
involved in the field of aging. In fact, "an important function 
of the Committee is to work closely with the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services and Ministry of Health, in dealing 
with matters relating to long term care and other services for 
S 'C't' ,,109 en~or ~ ~zens. 
Last, but not least, the Director of the Senior Citizens 
Department is a key figure in interactions between his Department 
and major actors in the field of aging at the provincial level. 110 
He is noted for his expertise and reputation in the field of aging. 
Over the years, the Director of Regional Niagara's Senior Citizens 
Department has developed a network of contacts with key actors 
in aging policy across Canada. He is also the current 
Chairman of Ontario's Advisory Council on Senior Citizens 
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which reports to the Provincial Secretary for Social Development, 
and a member of the Niagara District Health Council's Committee 
on Aging. For the above reasons, the Director of the Senior 
Citizens Department has frequent interactions with key provincial 
officials active in the field of aging (e.g., Ontario's 
Consultant on Gerontology, the Provincial Secretary for Social 
Development, the Program Consultant on Senior Citizens Services, 
officials from the Ministry of Health). 
Despite the many provincial-municipal interactions (i.e., 
interactions between the government of Ontario and the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara) that occur with respect to aging policy, 
they are not specifically aimed at co-ordination. None of the 
actors in these interactions indicated that they are for co-
ordination in aging policy_ Several actors did, however, suggest 
that co-ordination is a byproduct of other activities (e.g., 
supervision and control) and not an activity in itself. 
Federal~municipal interactions 
In general 
Generally, there is little direct interaction between 
federal and municipal governments. The reason for this is that, 
constitutionally, municipalities are wards of the provinces and 
not of the federal government. Provincial governments guard 
their positions vis-a-vis municipalities and resist any perceived 
federal encroachment on their prerogative. Consequently, 
provincial governments look with disfavour on direct federal-
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municipal interaction and prefer that the federal government 
deal with municipalities through provincial administrations. 
Regardless of provincial resistance, the federal 
government has intervened in municipal affairs. Often federal 
intervention has been indirect. For example, municipalities 
have had to adapt to the successive programs of the Canada 
M d · C . . III ortgage an Houslng ommlSSlon. There was at least one 
federal attempt to interact directly with municipalities. In 
the early 1970's, the federal government created a Ministry of 
State for Urban Affairs to co-ordinate federal urban-related 
t · 't' 112 ac lVl leSe This Ministry had no program or operational 
responsibilities, but part of its task was to promote co-
operation with other levels of government in respect of urban 
ff ' 113 a alrs. Its ability to promote co-op~ration was curtailed 
by "the aggressiveness of the provinces in inhibiting direct 
federal-municipal relations."114 It is interesting to note that 
the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs no longer exists. It 
was officially dissolved and some of its functions have been 
taken over by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. 
With respect to aging policy 
There is virtually no direct federal-municipal interaction 
with respect to aging policy. This observation is not surprising 
given the general state of federal-municipal relations. The few 
interactions that occur take place between the federal Department 
of Health and Welfare's New Horizons'field representatives and 
local recreation departments/commissions involved with seniors' 
. . 115 
organlsatlons. 
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Even these interactions, however, are not for co-ordination. 
Information is exchanged concerning proposed and accepted 
applications for New Horizons grants. 
Federal-provincial-municipal interactions 
(i.e., trilevel interactions) 
In general 
Trilevel interactions are rare. There used to be a 
Tripartite or Trilevel Conference that facilitated interactions 
among officials from all three levels of government. The 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (no longer in existence) 
initiated conference meetings. The first one was held in 1972. 
Since then, meetings were held on an occasional basis. There 
have not been any meetings for the past five years. The impact 
of Tripartite or Trilevel Conferences on federal-provincial-
municipal relations appears to have been negligible. One critic 
argued that "it cannot be said that these conferences have 
noticeably influenced central [federal and provincial] policies.,,116 
With respect to aging policy 
There are no trilevel interactions that focus on aging 
policy. 
Chapter Analysis and Summary 
This chapter, for the most part, described interactions 
between and among all levels of government in respect of aging 
policy. The interactions were discussed under five subcategories 
of intergovernmental interaction. Each category was viewed from 
the perspective of focal departments (i.e., the federal 
Department of National Health and Welfare, provincial departments 
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of social services and health, and Regional Niagara's Senior 
Citizens Department). Analysis of intergovernmental interactions 
according to the variables of formalisation and intensity, and 
the form of power available to the actors involved has been 
reserved for this part of the chapter. 
All subcategories of intergovernmental interaction are 
neither formalised nor intense. Most of these subcategories 
have not dealt with aging policy. The only exception to this 
observation is provincial-municipal interactions in the 
province of Ontario. Furthermore, none of the intergovernmental 
interactions described are directed at co-ordinating aging policy. 
Consequently, intergovernmental interactions cannot be characterised 
as formalised or intense. 
It should be noted that most intergovernmental interactions 
(i.e., federal-provincial, interprovincial, provincial-municipal, 
and federal-provincial-municipal interactions) are officially 
approved and mechanisms (i.e., intergovernmental committees and 
conferences) exist to facilitate them. Only federal-municipal 
interactions are on shaky ground because of provincial 
constitutional jurisdiction over local governments. The 
existence of mechanisms that provide a forum for intergovernmental 
interaction also makes frequency of interaction likely and 
indicates a sizable investment of resources. It must be 
remembered, however, that, regardless of the above, intergovernmental 
interactions are not for the purpose of co-ordination in the field 
f . 117 o aglng. 
Generally, influence is the only form of power available 
to actors in any intergovernmental interactions. The most 
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obvious example of the use of influence is in interprovincial 
interactions. Clearly, all provinces are constitutionally 
equal and separate spheres of jurisdiction. No province can 
control the actions of another province. Some provinces might 
be more influential than ~s depending on their own power 
resources (e.g., personal capabilities of officials, size and 
sophistication of provincial bureaucracies, possession of a 
valued good). Influence is the only form of power that can be 
exercised in federal-municipal and trilevel interactions. The 
federal government has no constitutional jurisdiction over 
municipalities; so control can not be used in interactions 
involving these two levels of government. Trilevel interactions 
also involve the exercise of influence for much the same reason. 
Federal-provincial interactions generally revolve around the 
reciprocal use of influence. Each of the two senior levels of 
government are supreme in their own areas of jurisdiction. 
Provincial-municipal interactions are an aberration 
from the preceding observation about the exercise of influence 
in intergovernmental interactions. Provincial governments have 
constitutional authority over their creations, local governments. 
Consequently, the former can use control over the latter. In 
practice, the ability of provincial governments to overtly 
control municipalities might be mitigated by certain other 
considerations (e.g., public opinion, the countervailing use of 
influence by local governments) • 
What then can be concluded about intergovernmental 
interactions in the field of aging? Only provincial-municipal 
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interactions, at least in Ontario, are concerned with aging 
policy. Even these interactions, nonetheless, are not for co-
ordination. They do occur at different levels (e.g., between 
the Ministry of Community and Social Services' Program Consultant 
on Senior Citizens Services and Administrators of Homes for the 
Aged, between Regional Niagara's Social Services Committee and 
the Ministries of Community and Social Services and Health, 
between the Director of Regional Niagara's Senior Citizens 
Department and Ontario's Consultant on Gerontology). Provincial-
municipal interactions in Ontario are also frequent. Both the 
mUltiplicity and frequency of these interaccions are linked to 
the general nature of provincial-municipal relations. Since 
municipalities are clearly subordinate to provincial governments 
and the latter exercise supervision and control over the former, 
interaction between these two levels of government is more 
extensive and frequent. Even in Ontario, however, there is no 
provincial-municipal committee on aging to facilitate provincial-
municipal interactions in the field of aging. The existence of 
such a committee hardly seems necessary in view of the extensive 
and frequent nature of provincial-municipal interactions with 
respect to aging policy. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter V of 
this thesis, co-ordination appears to be a function of regional 
government departments. 
CHAPTER VII 
Concluding Remarks, Suggested Hypotheses 
and Recommendations 
General Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify, 
describe and analyse interactions specifically aimed at co-
ordinating the development and implementation of aging policy 
at each level of government and between and among levels of 
government. The underlying intent of this endeavour was to 
discover major gaps in present governmental efforts to co-
ordinate policy in the field of aging. The identification of 
gaps is particularly important since any existing problems are 
likely to be compounded as the number of elderly in Canada 
increases. 
There is no doubt that an unprecedented, rapidly 
growing elderly clientele will have an impact on the 
governments of Canada. The impact of the geriatric boom can 
be roughly compared to the impact of the baby boom on 
governments in the 1950's and 1960's. No one was ready for 
those children. Will they be prepared for the aged? 
In order to cope with a rapidly growing elderly 
clientele, governments must co-ordinate the development and 
implementation of aging policy. Co-ordination is necessary for: 
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the selection of appropriate policy decisions (i.e., policy 
efficiency); the avoidance of duplication and overlap (i.e., 
administrative efficiency); and, the provision of services that 
are effective and responsive (i.e., service efficiency). The 
absence of co-ordination or poor co-ordination in aging policy 
will be detrimental to the elderly, to the governments of Canada, 
and to society as a whole. Wasted or improperly used resources 
(e.g., time, money, personnel) do not benefit anyone. 
An evaluation of existing efforts to co-ordinate the 
development and implementation of aging policy is, therefore, 
vital. There is still time to rectify any~weaknesses. For this 
reason, the final chapter of this thesis is concerned with 
outlining and explaining its major findings. Several general 
comparisons can be made about the interactions described and 
analysed in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI of this thesis. 
At the outset, it should be reiterated that all three 
levels of government have a role in aging policy and that 
program responsibilities vis-a-vis the elderly are parcelled 
out, in varying degrees, among several departments at both the 
federal and provincial levels of government. Major program 
responsibilities at the two senior levels of government, however, 
rest with departments of health and social services. In the 
Regional Municipality of Niagara, programs for the elderly are 
generally housed in one department--the Senior Citizens 
Department. 118 
Why is there no department on aging at either of the 
two senior levels of government? There are several plausible 
explanations. First, in view of the federal government's 
limited role in the field of aging, a separate department 
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devoted entirely to aging policy might not be necessary. Secondly, 
because aging policy is a relatively new policy area--most 
governments have not yet formulated official policy statements 
on aging--the need for a department on aging at either of the 
two senior levels of government might not be apparent. Thirdly, 
since aging policy is multifaceted and existing program 
responsibilities are shared by a number of departments, the 
creation of a separate department on aging might be undesirable. 
Finally, governments cannot establish new departments for every 
policy area nor is it politically and administratively feasible 
for them to do so. 
With respect to the interactions described and analysed 
in this thesis, more categories of interaction are formalised 
and intense at the federal level of government than at any 
other level. There are intradepartmental, interdepartmental, 
and executive-bureaucratic interactions at the federal level 
that are: (1) directed at co-ordinating aging policy (mostly 
within the context of social policy); (2) officially sanctioned; 
(3) facilitated by several co-ordinating mechanisms; (4) frequent; 
and, (5) typified by a sizable investment of resources. 
Generally, only executive-bureaucratic interactions at the 
provincial level of government exhibit these same characteristics. 
More than one category of interaction is formalised and intense 
at the municipal level of government. Interactions within the 
focal department (i.e., the Senior Citizens Department) and 
between it and other governmental actors (e.g., the Social 
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Services Committee) are formalised and intense. Given the 
nature of municipal government (i.e., no cabinet, no central 
agencies or cabinet secretariats, and no committees of cabinet 
per se), however, there are fewer categories of interaction 
(i.e., no executive-bureaucratic category) to begin with. 
What accounts for these variations among levels of 
government in the formalisation and intensity of categories of 
interaction? The most obvious answer to this question is that 
the lack of formalisation and intensity in certain categories 
of interaction (e.g., intradepartmental and interdepartmental 
interactions at the provincial level) reflects the need for 
interactions aimed specifically at co-ordination among the actors 
involved. It is noteworthy that many officials from provincial 
governments indicated that such a need existed especially 
between departments of social services and health. With respect 
to interactions at the municipal level, the existence of a 
department on aging lessens the need for other categories of 
interaction (e.g., interdepartmental interaction). A less 
obvious explanation for the variations noted above has to do 
with the quality of information provided by officials from each 
level of government. For example, the information received 
from the federal government was, for the most part, very detailed 
and extensive, whereas, in most cases, information from provincial 
sources was less comprehensive. The quality of information could 
have led to erroneous conclusions about the formalisation and 
intensity of certain categories of interaction. 
135 
Neither legislative-bureaucratic nor judicial-bureaucratic 
interactions are formalised and intense at either of the two 
senior levels of government. Parliament, federal courts, 
provincial legislatures, and provincial courts are not major 
actors in the field of aging. They do not interact with the 
focal departments for the purpose of co-ordinating aging pOlicy. 
The lack of formalisation and intensity in legislative-bureaucratic 
and judicial-bureaucratic interactions is probably related to 
the relatively minor role played by the legislatures (i.e., 
parliament and provincial legislatures) and the courts (i.e., 
federal and provincial courts) in the field of aging. 
At the municipal level of government, legislative-
bureaucratic interactions are both formalised and intense. 
Interactions between the Senior Citizens Department and other 
governmental actors (especially the Social Services Committee--a 
committee of Regional Council) are: (1) directed at co-ordinating 
aging policy; (2) officially sanctioned and facilitated by a 
co-ordinating mechanism; and, (3) frequent and typified by a 
sizable investment of resources. Thus, with respect to 
legislative-bureaucratic interactions, the Regional Municipality 
of Niagara is different from the two senior levels of government. 
The reason for this difference rests with the nature of local 
government (i.e., no cabinet and committees of Council that 
supervise government departments) . 
Judicial-bureaucratic interactions in the Niagara Region 
are, however, another matter. These interactions are simply 
nonexistent. There are no regionally administered courts (i.e., 
courts under the jurisdiction of regional government). 
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Governmental-nongovernmental interactions at any level 
of government are neither formalised nor intense. While these 
interactions are officially approved and frequent, they are not 
directed at co-ordinating policy in the field of aging. 
Governmental-nongovernmental interactions generally involve 
information exchange. Information exchange is necessary for the 
purpose of co-ordination; however, it does not necessarily mean 
that parts are properly related to one another. Interactions 
specifically aimed at co-ordination go beyond the mere exchange 
of information. 
Why are governmental-nongovernmental interactions not 
directed at co-ordinating aging policy? The answer to this 
question is likely twofold. First, governments might view 
co-ordination as a function of departments and not of the clientele 
they serve or of representatives of that clientele. Secondly, 
co-ordination might be seen as an inevitable consequence of 
information exchange. 
While the subject of governmental-nongovernmental 
interactions is being discussed, one dissimilarity concerning 
these interactions among levels of government is noteworthy. 
In general, there are more governmental-nongovernmental inter-
actions at the provincial level of government than at any other 
level. Correspondence with provincial officials b£ten indicated 
a close working relationship with certain nongovernmental 
organisations active in the field of aging. This close working 
relationship was noticeably absent from correspondence with 
federal officials and officials from the Regional Municipality 
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of Niagara. The reason for this particular difference might 
be linked to the fact that provincial governments have the most 
extensive role in aging policy, and it is, therefore, more 
likely that governmental-nongovernmental interactions will 
be concentrated at the provincial level than at any other 
level of government. Furthermore, nongovernmental organisations, 
at least in Regional Niagara, do not have an advocacy role in 
respect of aging policy_ They exist basically for the purpose 
of providing social and recreational activities for the elderly. 
They are not engaged in research on aging concerns nor do they 
attempt to speak for the aged in the political arena. 
Intergovernmental interactions are also neither formalised 
nor intense. As noted in Chapter VI, aging policy in its 
entirety has rarely been the focus of intergovernmental 
interaction let alone the object of co-ordination. The only 
exception to this observation is interactions between the 
government of Ontario and the Regional Municipality of Niagara. 119 
Even these interactions, however, are not aimed specifically 
at co-ordination in the field of aging. They largely involve 
provincial supervision and control over regional government 
responsibilities. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the 
paucity of intergovernmental interactions in the field of aging, 
and, more specifically, the lack of formalisation and intensity 
in these interactions. First, although all three levels of 
government have a role in aging policy, they might not perceive 
a need for intergovernmental interaction directed at co-
ordination. Secondly, co-ordination might be viewed as a 
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byproduct of other activities (e.g., intergovernmental negotiations 
and consultations, provincial supervision and control over 
municipalities). Therefore, it requires no deliberate effort 
(i.e., interactions aimed specifically at co-ordination). 
Thirdly, aging policy might not be salient enough to evoke 
intergovernmental interaction for co-ordination. Finally, there 
might be obstacles inherent in the bureaucratic organisation of 
governments that prevent or at least limit intergovernmental 
interactions for the purpose of co-ordination. 
Beyond the comparisons among levels of government that 
pertain to the formalisation and intensity of the various categories 
of interaction, several additional, general conclusions are 
noteworthy. 
Most interactions for co-ordination in aging policy at 
the federal and provincial levels of government occur in the 
executive-bureaucratic category of interaction. With the 
exception of Nova Scotia's Senior Citizens Secretariat (i.e., a 
cabinet committee), these interactions take place within a 
broader policy area (e.g., social policy). In the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara, however, most interactions occur within 
the focal department (i.e., the Senior Citizens Department) and 
they deal exclusively with aging policy. This dissimilarity might 
be related to the overall size and organisation of government 
and/or the fact that neither of the two senior levels of 
government has a department on aging. 
There are more co-ordinating mechanisms that deal with 
aging policy, often within the context of a broader policy field, 
at the two senior levels of government than in the Regional 
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Municipality of Niagara. For example, both the federal and 
provincial governments have several co-ordinating mechanisms to 
facilitate executive-bureaucratic interactions (i.e., the cabinet, 
cabinet committees, and central agencies or cabinet secretariats). 
Only the Social Services Committee plays a remotely similar role 
in Regional Niagara. The existence of numerous co-ordinating 
mechanisms in the executive-bureaucratic category of interaction 
at the federal and provincial levels of government appears to 
be linked to the overall size and complexity of government and/or 
the absence of a department on aging. 
Despite the existence of several co-ordinating mechanisms 
at both senior levels of government, relatively few of them deal 
exclusively with aging policy. There is no cabinet committee or 
interdepartmental committee on aging at the federal level of 
government. The federal Department of Health and Welfare does, 
however, have a Departmental Co-ordinating Committee on Aging 
(Le., an intradepartmental committee). No other department 
discussed in this thesis has such a committee. Among the provinces, 
only one province, Nova Scotia, has a cabinet committee devoted 
exclusively to aging policy (i.e., the Senior Citizens Secretariat). 
Three provinces (L e., Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario) have 
interdepartmental committees on aging or some aspect of aging 
policy. Only two of these committees (i.e., Saskatchewan's 
Interdepartmental Committee on Senior Citizens and Ontario's 
Triministerial Committee on Housing for the Elderly) facilitate 
interaction for the purpose of co-ordination. Generally, 
aging policy is considered by more broadly oriented 
co-ordinating mechanisms (e.g., cabinet 
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committees on social development) at both senior levels of 
government. Because aging policy is accommodated by these 
existing mechanisms, there might not be a need for co~ordinating 
mechanisms devoted exclusively to policy in the field of aging. 
On the other hand, the paucity of interactions aimed at co-
ordination in some categories at the provincial level (i.e., 
intradepartmental and interdepartmental interactions) might 
require the creation of co-ordinating mechanisms on aging. 
Those interactions directed at co-ordination at the 
federal and provincial levels of government are concerned with 
policy development, whereas, interactions in the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara are generally conducted for the purpose 
of co-ordinating the implementation of programs for the elderly. 
What accounts for this difference? Since local governments are, 
by their very nature, service delivery oriented, they are more 
likely to be involved in co-ordinating the implementation as 
opposed to the development of programs. For example, the 
Regional Municipality of Niagara was delegated responsibility 
for, among other things, the delivery of certain social welfare 
services (e.g., Homes for the Aged, community-based programs 
for the elderly) in the Niagara Region. Those social welfare 
services applicable to the aged are mostly delivered by the 
Senior Citizens Department. Program development, in particular 
the development of broad policy guidelines, is, however, 
conducted by the government of Ontario (i.e, the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services). This division of responsibilities 
can account for the service delivery orientation of the Regional 
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Municipality of Niagara, and the program development orientation 
of its creator, the provincial government--at least in respect 
of aging policy. The federal government, on the other hand, does 
not really deliver much in the way of programs for the elderly_ 
Its limited role in the field of aging might explain the absence 
of efforts to co-ordinate the implementation of aging policy at 
the federal level. Finally, co-ordination in policy implementation 
might be seen as a natural consequence of co-ordinating the 
development of policy and/or policy implementation might be co-
ordinated at the field office level. 
The last general conclusion is that the same patterns 
of control and/or influence among major actors in the field of 
aging for each category of interaction are evident at all levels 
of government. Generally, intraorganisational (i.e., intra-
departmental) interactions can involve the exercise of both 
control and influence, while interorganisational (i.e., inter-
departmental, executive-bureaucratic, governmental-nongovernmental, 
and intergovernmental) interactions entail the use of influence 
alone. The only exception to this generalisation is provincial-
municipal interactions. Provincial governments can exercise 
control as well as influence in interactions with municipalities 
because the latter are under the constitutional jurisdiction of 
the former. The ability to use control depends on the possession 
of legal-rational authority and this explains the patterns noted 
above. 
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The Major Conclusion 
One major finding emerges from the overall assessment 
of present governmental efforts to co-ordinate the development 
and implementation of aging policy. The level of government 
most active in this policy field, the provincial level, ranks 
below other levels of government with respect to deliberate 
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of interaction involving major actors, the following gaps exist: 
Level of Government Category of Interaction 
federal intergovernmental 
governmental-nongovernmental 
provincial intradepartmental 
interdepartmental 
intergovernmental 
governmental-nongovernmental 
municipal (Regional Niagara) intergovernmental 
governmental-nongovernmental 
While interactions do occur in most of the above categories, 
they are not aimed at co-ordinating policy in the field of aging. 
The crucial point, however, is that there are more gaps at the 
provincial level than at the other levels of government. (See 
accompanying Tables 5, 6 and 7 for complete details.) It is 
reasonable to expect that the more active a government is in a 
policy field, the more effort it would make to co-ordinate its 
activities in that field. Why is this expectation not realised? 
There are several plausible explanations for the 
existence of all gaps in interactions for co-ordination in aging 
policy and especially those at the provincial level. In the 
first place, the existence of gaps could be in part a function 
of the information received from key officials at each level of 
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TABLE 5 
Modified Version of Kernaghan's Institutional Framevvork 
level of Government--Federal 
Focal Department--Dept. of National Health and Welfare 
1 
Broad Patterns and 
Major Categories 
Interaction 
Internal 
Intradepartmental 
External--Within 
Government 
Interdepartmental 
of 
2 
Actors 
Line units 
Staff units 
Field Units 
Focal Depa.rtIrent 
Other Departments 
3 
Fonn (s) of Power 
Available to 
Actors 
Control, 
Influence 
Influence 
4 
Fonnalisation 
Intensity of 
Interactions 
Fonnalised 
Intense 
Fonnalised 
Intense 
and 
--------------------- ----------------------------------------- -------------------
Executive-
bureaucratic 
Legislative-
bureaucratic 
Focal Department 
Prime Minister 
Cabinet 
Central Agencies 
Generally, 
Influence 
Fonnalised 
Intense 
----------------------~------------------ -------------------
Focal Department 
Parliament Control, Neither Fonnalised 
Officers of Influence Nor Intense 
Parliament 
--------------------- ------------~---------~------------------r-------------------
Judicial-
bureaucratic 
External--Dutside 
Government 
Intergovernmental 
Focal Department Control, Neither Fonnalised 
Suprerre Court Influence Nor Intense 
Federal Court 
Focal Department 
Departments and 
Government 
Institutions at 
Provincial and 
Municipal levels 
of Government 
Intergovernmental 
Bodies 
Influence 
Neither Fonnalised 
Nor Intense 
--------------------- ----------------------~------------------
Governmental-
nongovernmental 
Focal Department 
Nongovernmental 
Organisations 
Influence Neither Fonnalised 
Nor Intense 
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Modified Version of Kernaghan's Institutional Frarrework 
Level of Government--Provincial 
Focal Depart1nent (s) --Depts. of Social Services and Health 
1 
Broad Patterns and 
Major Categories of 
Interaction 
Internal 
2 
Actors 
----------( Line Units 
Intradepart1nental Staff Units 
Field units 
External--Within 
Government 
Focal Depart1nent(s) 
Interdepart1nental other Depart1nents 
Executive-
bureaucratic 
Legislative-
bureaucratic 
Judicial-
bureaucratic 
External--Outside 
Goverrnnent 
Focal Department (s) 
Premier 
Executive Committee 
Cabinet Secretariats 
Focal Department(s) 
Legislature 
Officers of 
Legislature 
Focal Department (s) 
Provincial Courts 
Focal Department 
Depart1nents and 
Government 
Institutions at 
Intergovernmental Federal and 
Goverrnnental-
nongovernmental 
Municipal Levels 
of Goverrnnent 
Intergovernmental 
Bcrlies 
Focal Department (s) 
Nongovernmental 
Organisations 
3 
Form(s) of Power 
Available to 
Actors 
4 I 
Formalisation and 
Intensity of 
Interactions 
Neither Formalised 
Control, Influence Nor Intense 
Influence 
Generally, 
Influence 
Control, 
Influence 
Control, 
Influence 
Neither Formalised 
Nor Intense 
Formalised 
Intense 
Neither Formalised 
Nor Intense 
Neither Formalised 
Nor Intense 
Generally, Neither Formalised 
Influence Except Nor Intense 
in Provincial-
Municipal 
Interactions 
Influence Neither Formalised 
Nor Intense 
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TABlE 7 
Modified Version of Kernaghan's Institutional Framework 
level of Govemment--Regional Municipality of Niagara 
Focal Departrnent--Senior Citizens Department 
1 
Broad Patterns and 
Major Categories of 
Interaction 
Internal 
Intradepartmental 
External--Within 
Governm:mt 
Interdepartmental 
I 2 
Actors 
Line Units 
Staff units 
Field Units 
Focal Department 
other Departments 
I 3 
Form (s) of Power 
Available to 
Actors 
Control, 
Influence 
Influence 
4 
Fonnalisation and 
Intensity of 
Interactions 
Fonnalised 
Intense 
Neither Formalised 
Nor Intense 
--------------------- --------------------~---------------------------------------
Executive-
bureaucratic 
legislative-
bureaucratic 
Judicial-
bureaucratic 
External--Outside 
Government 
Intergovernmental 
Govemmental-
nongovernmental 
( DOES Nor APPLY 
--------------------~--------------------~------------------
Focal Department Control, Fonnalised 
Regional Council Influence Intense 
--------------------r--------------------~------------------
( 
Focal Department 
Departments and 
Government 
Institutions at 
Federal and 
Provincial levels 
of Government 
Intergovernm:mtal 
Bodies 
DOES Nor APPLY 
Generally, 
Influence Except 
in Provincial-
M.unicipal 
Interactions 
Neither Fonnalised 
Nor Intense 
--------------------~--------------------~------------------
Focal Department Neither Fonnalised 
Nongovemmental Influence Nor Intense 
Organisations 
146 
government. The information provided by provincial officials 
tended to be less comprehensive than that received from officials 
at other levels of government. Consequently, there might be more 
deliberate efforts to co-ordinate the development and implementation 
of aging policy than is apparent in the data supplied by provincial 
officials. Since there was no apparent reluctance on the part of 
provincial officials to provide information about their efforts 
to co-ordinate, it is more likely that the gaps in interactions 
for co-ordination are real. Secondly, co-ordination might be 
achieved or performed in ways other than through interactions 
explicitly directed at co-ordination. Co-ordination could be 
an implicit objective or unintended consequence of interactions 
designed for other purposes (e.g., information exchange, 
negotiation). It might also be viewed as an integral part of 
planning, organising, staffing, and so on. Thirdly, co-ordination 
could be perceived as unimportant. Governments might view 
duplication and overlap, in some instances, as beneficial. 
Duplication and overlap can act as safety valves in event of 
some breakdown or oversight. 12l Finally, gaps in interactions 
could very well indicate the absence of efforts to co-ordinate 
aging policy. This explanation is especially persuasive in 
light of the fact that many government officials, particularly 
those at the provincial level, expressed a need for more co-
ordination in the field of aging. 
Bureaucracy--An Obstacle to Co-ordination? 
There is an explanation for the existence of gaps in 
interactions for co-ordination that goes beyond those enumerated 
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above. It lies in the nature of bureaucratic organisations. 
If co-ordination is deemed desirable and it is performed or 
achieved through interactions specifically aimed at co-ordination, 
why do gaps exist in present efforts to co-ordinate aging policy? 
Why are these gaps especially prevalent at the provincial level 
of government? 
Government departments are bureaucratic organisations 
and bureaucracies have certain inherent characteristics, both 
structural and behavioural, that inhibit interactions for co-
ordination. Some of these are: 
- large size 
- a high degree of specialisation of functions 
rigid hierarchical relationships 
- an emphasis on control 
- a narrowly defined sense of loyalty 
(i.e., loyalty to a particular administrative 
unit) 
- competitiveness with other administrative units 
- territorial sensitivity 
Each of the above bureaucratic traits acts as an obstacle to 
interactions for co-ordination. 
The relationship between characteristics of a bureaucratic 
form of organisation and interactions for co~ordination can be 
, shown through the example of territorial sensitivity. 
122 Departments see themselves as occupying a certain policy space. 
This policy space, in effect, defines the territorial boundaries 
of departments. Departments, by their very nature, seek to 
protect their boundaries. Anthony Downs refers to this 
.. " . . 1 ... ,,123 protect~on~sm as terr~torLa sens~t~v~ty. Interactions 
with other departments, especially interactions that go beyond 
a mere exchange of information, can easily be interpreted as 
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jeopardising the policy space or territorial boundaries of 
departments. Interactions for the purpose of co-ordination are 
even more threatening when several departments occupy the same 
policy space (e.g., aging policy) because territorial boundaries 
overlap and, as a result, they are more susceptible to perceived 
encroachment. Consequently, territorial sensitivity inhibits 
interactions for co-ordination. 
Territorial sensitivity is particularly important for 
understanding gaps in efforts to co-ordinate aging policy at the 
provincial level of government. Unlike the federal government 
and the Regional Municipality of Niagara, most provinces have 
two departments that share major program responsibilities in the 
field of aging--the departments of health and social services. 
There is, however, very little effort to co-ordinate the 
activities of these major departmental actors. Perhaps the 
reason for this finding is that the departments concerned are 
reluctant to interact with each other because of territorial 
sensitivity and its concomitant resistance to any perceived 
encroachment. Territorial sensitivity is less of an obstacle 
at the federal level of government and in the Regional 
Municipality of Niagara because only one department has major 
program responsibilities in the field of aging. 
A number of other gaps in interactions for co-ordination 
can be explained by territorial sensitivity. Units within a 
department might see themselves as occupying a certain policy 
space and, therefore, be disinclined to interact with other 
departmental units. For example, there is very little interaction 
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among three divisions with program responsibilities vis-a-vis 
the elderly (i.e., Aging Services, Special Services and Field 
Services) in Prince Edward Island's Department of Health and 
Social Services. Territorial sensitivity is also characteristic 
of relations between and among levels of government. Each level 
of government seeks to protect its jurisdictional boundaries 
and intergovernmental interactions might be viewed as encroachments. 
This interpretation of intergovernmental interactions is held by 
provincial governments with respect to federal-municipal 
interactions. Territorial sensitivity is less applicable to 
governmental-nongovernmental interactions; however, one could 
argue that even these interactions involve an element of 
protectionism. For example, nongovernmental organisations 
engaged in the provision of certain services to the elderly 
might be seen as potentially usurping departmental functions. 
Hence, departments could be wary of any interactions with 
nongovernmental organisations that extend beyond an exchange 
of information. 
While territorial sensitivity has been used to explain 
gaps in interactions for co-ordination in aging policy, it is 
only one of many obstacles inherent in the bureaucratic 
organisation of departments that hinder such interactions. One 
can take each of the previously enumerated traits of bureaucracy 
and show how it affects interactions. 
The larger a department is, the more difficult interactions 
for co-ordination among the relevant actors become. The likelihood 
of interactions decreases as the size of the department increases. 
The converse of this association has already been discussed in 
f t R · l' IS' .. 124 re erence 0 eglona Nlagara s enlor Cltlzens Department. 
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A high degree of specialisation of functions detracts 
from interactions for co-ordination. As functions and the 
individuals performing them become more specialised, there is 
less of an opportunity for interactions. The likelihood of 
interactions decreases as the degree of specialisation increases. 
Rigid hierarchical relationships are also detrimental 
to interactions for co-ordination. They emphasize superior-
subordinate interactions at the expense of interactions outside 
of a hierarchical association. These latter interactions are 
necessary in large departments where the relevant actors might 
not be hierarchically linked. It is notable that all but one 
focal department--Regional Niagara's Senior Citizens Department--
are large. The likelihood of horizontal interactions decreases 
as the emphasis on vertical interactions increases. 
An emphasis on control, which is a crucial component of 
the bureaucratic form of organisation, detracts from certain 
interactions for co-ordination. As noted in Chapter I, interactions 
aimed at co-ordination can involve the use of control or 
influence. Most of the categories of interaction analysed in 
this thesis involve the exercise of influence. (See Tables 5, 
6 and 7 for details.) An emphasis on control ignores the 
necessity of relations not based on the possession of legal-
rational authority and jeopardises the effectiveness of 
interactions dependent on voluntary compliance. The likelihood 
of interactions involving influence decreases as the emphasis 
on interactions involving control increases. 
A narrowly defined sense of loyalty inhibits interactions 
for co-ordination outside that sphere of loyalty. It is not 
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conducive to a common sense of purpose--a purpose that must 
spearhead any efforts to co-ordinate. Furthermore, a narrowly 
defined sense of loyalty might view interactions with other 
actors as disloyal. The likelihood of interactions decreases 
as the sense of loyalty becomes more narrowly defined. 
Finally, competitiveness among departments for clientele, 
funds and status can hinder interactions for co-ordination. 
While competition is not necessarily counterproductive, it can 
lead to more conflict than co-operation. Interactions for co-
ordination require co-operation among the actors. Conflict 
jeopardises these interactions. The likelihood of interactions 
decreases as competitiveness among departments increases. 
In effect, each characteristic of bureaucracy can be 
treated as an independent variable and examined for its impact 
on interactions for co-ordination. The relationships are 
shown schematically below. 
Independent Variables 
- large size 
- a high degree of 
specialisation of 
functions 
- rigid hierarchical 
relationships 
- an emphasis on control 
- a narrowly defined 
sense of loyalty 
- competitiveness with other 
administrative units 
- territorial sensitivity 
) 
» 
) 
) 
)' 
Dependent Variable 
interactions for 
co-ordination 
These associations add up to a more general relationship between 
a bureaucratic form of organisation (independent variable) and 
interactions for co-ordination (dependent variable) . 
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Recommendations 
The preceding discussion of obstacles inherent in the 
bureaucratic form of organisation and their impact on 
interactions for co-ordination has an interesting implication. 
Are these obstacles insurmountable? Do they make co-ordination, 
at least in the governmental context, impossible? Given the 
nature of bureaucracy, co-ordination is difficult but not 
impossible. How then can co-ordination in aging policy be 
improved? 
Recommendations for improving co-ordination in the 
field of aging generally fall into one of two alternatives. 
One alternative involves the creation of co-ordinating mechanisms 
that deal exclusively with aging policy (e.g., interdepartmental 
committees on aging). The other alternative requires the 
establishment of a department on aging. This solution is the 
most extensive measure for improving co-ordination because all 
existing program responsibilities vis-a.-vis the elderly would 
have to be siphoned into one separate department. It is notable 
that in the United States, the State of Connecticut has a 
Department on Aging whose broad mandate is "the development and 
administering of programs and services; and to provide planning, 
. f . d d' t' f . ,,125 ln ormatlon an coOP 'bna 'bon unctlons. [Italics mine.] 
Connecticut's Department on Aging is funded by both federal and 
state governments and uses staff from a variety of agencies and 
departments. 
Both alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages. 
For example, a department on aging, like Regional Niagara's 
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Senior Citizens Department, can facilitate interactions for 
co-ordination more readily than if program responsibilities are 
parcelled out among several departments; however, can such a 
department find justification for its continued existence when 
the aging phenomenon is no longer a phenomenon? 
The most practical and long-term solution to the need 
for co-ordination in aging policy or any policy field is to 
recognise that a bureaucratic form of organisation imposes 
certain obstacles to interactions for co-ordination. Regardless 
of any short-term solutions, these obstacles are enduring. The 
only way to ensure some measure of co-ordination is to make a 
conscious or deliberate effort to co-ordinate. This does not 
require a structural change so much as an attitudinal change. 
It is generally acknowledged that the latter is more difficult 
to operationalise than the former. Furthermore, a deliberate 
effort to co-ordinate does not necessarily guarantee co-ordination. 
It must be recognised, however, that given the obstacles inherent 
in a bureaucratic form of organisation co-ordination will not 
necessarily be performed or achieved unless a conscious effort 
is made. To assume that co-ordination will inevitably occur as 
part of other activities or as a result of them is to leave co-
ordination up to chance. The need for a deliberate effort to 
co-ordinate can be easily overlooked, but the ramifications 
(i.e., poor policy, administrative and service efficiency) of 
such an oversight are obvious. The very obstacles impinging 
on interactions for the purpose of co-ordination make these 
interactions all the more essential. 
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How can an attitudinal change be brought about? A 
simple sblution would be to assign responsibility for interactions 
for co-ordination in the job description of public servants. 
Assigning responsibility does not, however, mean that it will 
be fulfilled. A more effective but admittedly gradual and 
long-term approach would entail indoctrinating a value for 
interactions aimed at co-ordination through the organisational 
socialisation process. This process begins when an individual 
is recruited for a public service position and it continues 
throughout his/her civil service career. Through the organisational 
socialisation process: (1) the individual learns the expectations 
attached to the position he/she occupies in the organisation; 
and, (2) the individual internalises certain expectations as 
values. 126 Interactions for co-ordination should, therefore, 
be an expectation and internalised value of public servants. 
The likelihood of interactions for co-ordination in aging policy 
or any policy field is greater if a value for such interactions 
is internalised among the relevant actors. 
In conclusion, the following remarks by Graham Clarkson 
should foreshadow the future. 
There is little doubt that society will react 
and adapt in time to the changing age-mix of 
the popUlation and the implications that this 
carries. Anticipating and planning for such 
change will assist in relieving problems before 
they get out of hand and cause needless 
difficulties. To do so effectively requires 
co-ordination in planning and in the development 
of programs and services to cope with changes as 
they develop. This will be difficult for it 
calls for unprecedented foresight and discipline. 
To the extent that it is achieved it will allow 
the heterogeneous group of people classified as 
older citizens to exploit their later years to 
the full. 12 7 
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The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that Canadian 
governments have some distance to travel on the road of co-
ordination in aging policy_ 
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